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I. INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination law has befuddled most of those who
have attempted to master it. Confusion arises when one attempts to
reconcile the two frameworks that govern individual treatment cases:
the McDonnell Douglas1 approach and the Price Waterhouse2 approach. McDonnell Douglas provides an elaborate, three-step, burden-shifting framework, in which the plaintiff must ultimately prove
that the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext for discrimination.3 The as∗ Associate Professor, Fordham University Graduate School of Business Administration. B.A., S.U.N.Y. at Binghamton, 1969; M.A., California State University at Long
Beach, 1971; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, 1977.
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989), superseded by statute as
stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
3. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas
framework is to aid plaintiffs in the elusive enterprise of proving discriminatory intent. See
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (stating that “[t]here will seldom be
‘eyewitness testimony’ as to the employer’s mental processes”). But see Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
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sumption of this approach is that either the discriminatory reason or
a nondiscriminatory reason—but not both—motivated the adverse
employment action. In contrast to McDonnell Douglas, which applies
to “single-motive” cases, Price Waterhouse applies to “mixed-motive”
cases. Under the Price Waterhouse approach, a plaintiff prevails if he
can prove that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor leading
to the adverse employment action.4 Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant may avoid having to pay damages by establishing
a partial affirmative defense: the defendant must show that it would
have taken the adverse action based on the nondiscriminatory reason
alone.5 Thus, these approaches differ on who bears the burden of
proving or disproving the defendant’s nondiscriminatory justification
for the challenged decision: under McDonnell Douglas the plaintiff
must disprove the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason,6
while under Price Waterhouse the defendant must prove that its alleged nondiscriminatory reason was a determinative cause for the
adverse employment decision.7
It has never been clear whether one or the other of these two approaches applies to a given disparate treatment case. Justice O’Connor suggested, in her influential concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, that Price Waterhouse applies only when the plaintiff offers
direct evidence of discrimination.8 An offer of direct rather than circumstantial evidence, Justice O’Connor argued, earned the plaintiff
the right to shift the burden of persuasion, forcing the defendant to
establish the partial affirmative defense.9 This view implies that
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1206-07 (1995) (arguing that disparate treatment theory, in searching for the defendant’s motivation, misses the critical
point that most discriminatory conduct results from cognitive processes that are unconscious).
4. Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides: “Except as otherwise provided
in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. Section 107 of the
Civil Rights Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). This Article will refer to the provisions interchangeably.
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m)
of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,
the court— (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided
in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
7. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45.
8. Id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. See id.
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when the plaintiff relies on mere circumstantial evidence the
McDonnell Douglas framework applies and the plaintiff does not receive the benefit of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Although most circuit courts followed Justice O’Connor’s prescription, they took conflicting positions of what constitutes “direct
evidence” of discrimination.10 This disagreement led to a fractured
body of discrimination law.
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,11 the Supreme Court resolved this
issue, holding that any evidence, whether direct or circumstantial,
may meet the motivating factor test of Price Waterhouse.12 To shift
the burden of persuasion to the defendant, the plaintiff must prove,
by any available evidence, that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor contributing to the adverse employment decision.13 Unfortunately, the Costa Court did not even mention McDonnell Douglas,
leaving judges and scholars to speculate about the fate of the threestep, burden-shifting framework.14
This Article argues that, by gobbling up circumstantial cases,
Costa has left little for McDonnell Douglas. Costa permits the use of
any evidence to meet the motivating factor test. Such evidence may
be proof that the defendant’s explanation for its conduct was a pretext for discrimination. Proving that the defendant’s explanation was
a pretext for discrimination, however, has always been the province
of the McDonnell Douglas framework. The only meaningful element
of McDonnell Douglas, after Costa, is that a plaintiff invoking
McDonnell Douglas forces the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory explanation for its conduct. Absent McDonnell Douglas, the
defendant is under no such obligation. This element, however, is not
highly significant because in the vast majority of cases defendants
will choose as a matter of tactical necessity to offer a nondiscriminatory explanation. By failing to present the factfinder with a justification for its conduct, a defendant forfeits the partial affirmative defense under Price Waterhouse. Moreover, a defendant who fails to offer such a justification risks that the jury will infer that the defendant does not have one.
10. See infra notes 98-123 and accompanying text (discussing the various positions on
how the circuit courts defined direct evidence).
11. 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
12. This Article does not address whether Costa or the mixed-motive analysis apply to
discrimination cases brought under statutes other than Title VII. See Bolander v. BP Oil
Co., 2003 WL 22060351, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2003) (holding that Costa and the mixedmotive analysis do not apply to cases arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)). But see Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir. 1997)
(applying the mixed-motive analysis in an action arising under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
13. See Costa, 123 S. Ct. at 2154-55.
14. See infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text (discussing various judicial views of
the viability of McDonnell Douglas after Costa).
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The marginal benefit of McDonnell Douglas—forcing the defendant to articulate an explanation for the challenged employment action—does not justify the continued existence of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. McDonnell Douglas, as originally adopted by the
Supreme Court in 1973, provided civil rights plaintiffs with a potent
means for establishing discriminatory intent. By disproving the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. Though somewhat Byzantine with its complex allocations of burdens of proof, the framework was arguably justified
as initially conceived because it established an inferential method for
proving discrimination. Later decisions, culminating in Costa, however, have so thoroughly eroded this formulation that it no longer
serves any meaningful purpose. Even before Costa, the Supreme
Court held in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks that if a civil rights
plaintiff disproved the defendant’s articulated reason, the jury, in its
discretion, might or might not find for the plaintiff.15 In Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Court went even further by
holding that in some cases a judge might rule for the defendant even
when the plaintiff disproved the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason but had no additional evidence of discriminatory
intent.16 Reduced to an empty formality, the McDonnell Douglas
framework should therefore be abandoned and replaced by Price
Waterhouse as modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and as explained by Costa.
Part II of this Article discusses the history and current state of
the McDonnell Douglas approach, and shows how Hicks and Reeves
robbed the approach of its vitality. This Part also highlights confusion that the McDonnell Douglas approach has spawned because of
its inadequacies and complexities. Next, this Part discusses Price
Waterhouse, revealing the conflicts caused by simultaneously characterizing the Price Waterhouse framework as applying to mixedmotive cases and direct-evidence cases. This Part goes on to discuss
the federal judiciary’s contradictory interpretations of “direct evidence” within the meaning of Price Waterhouse.
Part III analyzes the Costa decision and then examines its implications. First, Costa removed the trap set by the interplay of Price
Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas: some civil rights plaintiffs with
strong circumstantial cases could meet neither the McDonnell Douglas pretext standard, nor the Price Waterhouse direct-evidence standard. Second, by accepting circumstantial evidence to support the
motivating factor test, Costa marginalized the role of McDonnell

15. 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
16. 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
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Douglas. Part III concludes with an analysis of lower court decisions
interpreting Costa.
Part IV discusses § 2000e-2(m) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
section codifying the motivating factor test.17 Next, Part IV shows
how Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins18 has hindered many from understanding the universal causation requirement of individual disparate
treatment law: the motivating factor standard. Although some believe that McDonnell Douglas requires a heightened level of causation, proof of pretext is merely circumstantial evidence that discrimination motivated the employer’s decision, rather than proof that discrimination was the but-for cause of that decision. Part IV then explores several proposals to unify individual disparate treatment law,
and ultimately suggests that Congress should clarify that the motivating factor test is universally applicable to individual disparate
treatment cases. Congress should abandon the McDonnell Douglas
framework and declare that the Price Waterhouse approach governs
all individual disparate treatment cases. Such congressional action
would rid the law of McDonnell Douglas’ pointless complexities and
its inappropriate one-size-fits-all formalism. In its place, a sensible
and serviceable unitary framework would emerge.
II. INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW BEFORE COSTA
Two approaches govern individual disparate treatment law: the
McDonnell Douglas approach and the Price Waterhouse approach.
Not only have both approaches undergone striking metamorphoses,
but also courts have been unable to join the two approaches into a
comprehensive and intelligible framework.
A. The Rise and Fall of McDonnell Douglas
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court confronted a typical
discrimination case. The evidence of discriminatory motive rested on
inference rather than on concrete evidence. As part of a reduction in
force, McDonnell Douglas laid off Green, a mechanic and laboratory
technician who had worked for the company for eight years.19 After
being laid off, Green, a long time civil rights activist, participated in
a “stall-in,” a concerted action that blocked the access roads to

17. Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the motivating factor test of
Price Waterhouse and converted the same-decision affirmative defense of Price Waterhouse
into a partial defense limiting available remedies. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-(g)(2)(b)
(2000). For the sake of convenience, this Article will refer to cases governed by section 107
as “Price Waterhouse cases” and refers to the law governing such cases as the “Price
Waterhouse approach.”
18. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
19. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973).
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McDonnell Douglas’ plant.20 The police arrested Green for obstructing traffic.21 When Green applied for an available mechanic’s position, McDonnell Douglas rejected him ostensibly because of his anticompany activities.22 Alleging racial discrimination, Green sued
McDonnell Douglas under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.23
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, not so much because it was
interested in the particular facts of the case, but rather, because the
case presented the Court with an opportunity to create a framework
for allocating the burdens of proof in employment discrimination
cases.24
One might wonder why the Court felt obliged to engage in such an
endeavor. Subtle discrimination cases such as McDonnell Douglas
had dogged the judiciary because of the elusiveness of proving or disproving discriminatory intent. Unlike most other types of cases, discrimination suits often rest on a thin evidentiary base. By way of
contrast, in a breach of contract case written documents frequently
provide an evidentiary record of relevant transactions. In auto accident cases, forensic evidence and eyewitness accounts may resolve
contested issues of fact. But many discrimination cases depend on
revealing shadowy motives that no one would publicly articulate or
be foolish enough to memorialize. To prove a case often requires the
plaintiff to reveal the defendant’s secret thoughts. McDonnell Douglas was such a case. Green offered no evidence of racial slurs, nor had
he discovered any incriminating documents.25 The mere fact that he
was qualified as a mechanic and rejected for the position was not and
should not have been sufficient to make his case of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, Green may have been right. Those who discriminate do not trumpet their intent.
To establish a framework to simplify the thorny issue of proving
discriminatory intent, the Court created a three-step, burden-shifting
approach. The plaintiff, at step one, must prove a prima facie case by
a preponderance of the evidence.26 A prima facie showing, in a refusal-to-hire case, has four elements: (1) the plaintiff was in a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for a job and applied for it,

20. Id. at 794.
21. Id. at 795. A highly organized action, the stall-in involved five teams of four cars,
which blocked five main access roads to the plant. The drivers turned off their engines, engaged the emergency brakes, and waited until the police arrived. Id. at 794. ACTION, a
civil rights organization, conducted a “lock-in,” which involved padlocking the front door of
an office building where a number of company employees worked. Id. at 795 n.3. Trial testimony conflicted over whether Green cooperated in or authorized the “lock-in.” Id.
22. Id. at 796.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 798.
25. See generally id. at 792-807.
26. Id. at 802.
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(3) the defendant rejected him, and (4) the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants with plaintiff’s qualifications.27 As the Supreme Court later explained in Burdine, the
prima facie case forces the plaintiff to eliminate the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons that a defendant might articulate to justify an adverse employment action.28 Establishing a prima facie case
creates a presumption of discrimination.29 Once the plaintiff has
proven a prima facie case, the defendant, at step two, must articulate
one or more nondiscriminatory reasons for the refusal to hire.30 The
step-two burden is merely one of production, not persuasion.31 The
defendant’s failure to meet this minimal burden results in judgment
for the plaintiff,32 but by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for
its action, the defendant rebuts the presumption of discrimination.
The purpose of requiring the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason is to sharpen the focus on the ultimate issue, which is
discriminatory intent.33 Thus, once the defendant has met this burden of production, “the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity.”34 At step three, the plaintiff “must . . . be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that [defendant’s] stated reason for [plaintiff’s]
rejection was in fact pretext.”35 This burden, the Burdine Court ex-

27. Id. The Court noted that, in varying factual contexts, the elements of a prima facie case will differ. Id. at n.14. It makes no sense, for example, to require a plaintiff to show
he was rejected for a job in a wrongful termination case.
28. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
29. Id. at 254.
30. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. McDonnell Douglas assigned as its step-two
reason for rejecting Green his participation in unlawful conduct directed against the company. Id. at 803. The Court held that the company had thereby met its burden of production. Id. The Eighth Circuit intimated that McDonnell Douglas’ articulated reason carried
little weight because it was subjective rather than objective. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the circuit court’s position, reasoning that Title VII does not obligate an employer to
hire a worker who had engaged in illegal conduct directed against it. Id.
31. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 255 n.8.
34. Id. at 255.
35. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56 (holding
that placing the burden of production on the defendant serves “to frame the factual issue
with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext”). The Court summarized plaintiff’s burden at step three as follows: “In
short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a
coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. In addition, the Court explained the legal consequences that would result from plaintiff’s ability
or inability to prove pretext:
On retrial, respondent must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that
petitioner’s assigned reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application. If the District Judge so finds, he must order a
prompt and appropriate remedy. In the absence of such a finding, petitioner’s
refusal to rehire must stand.
Id. at 807.
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plained, “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that [plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.”36 A
plaintiff “may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.”37
The McDonnell Douglas Court provided Green with detailed guidance as to how, on remand, he might show pretext. First, Green could
offer evidence that the company retained or rehired white employees
who had engaged in misconduct comparable to Green’s unlawful
acts.38 Green might also offer evidence of (1) how the company
treated him before laying him off, (2) the company’s reactions to any
legitimate civil rights activities in which Green engaged, and (3) the
company’s general policies and practices regarding minority employment.39 In addition, statistical evidence of a pattern of racial discrimination would support Green’s pretext argument.40
The meaning of McDonnell Douglas, as explained by Burdine, is
unmistakable. If the plaintiff can disprove the defendant’s articulated reasons, the factfinder must conclude that the defendant discriminated. This deduction follows from two premises: employers do

36. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
37. Id.
38. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
39. Id. at 804-05. It is hard to see how the company’s hiring policies and practices
were relevant to proving pretext as opposed to proving discriminatory intent through the
use of any circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Perhaps, the Court was indicating
that circumstantial proof of discrimination unrelated to the enterprise of disproving the defendant’s explanation might assist the plaintiff in proving pretext. In Manzer v. Diamond
Shamrock Chemicals Co., the Sixth Circuit followed this line of thought, holding that a
plaintiff may prove pretext by the sheer weight of circumstantial evidence. 29 F.3d 1078,
1084 (6th Cir. 1994). But if pretext can be proven by any circumstantial evidence of discrimination, then the Court has undermined its insistence that the plaintiff prove pretext
at all. In other words, we are left with a standard that accepts any evidence of discrimination, including evidence of pretext, but does not require any particular showing. In essence,
proving pretext as opposed to proving discrimination through circumstantial evidence becomes optional. Such a conclusion would make sense if the Court meant that the plaintiff,
without proving pretext, could establish a case. The Court did state, after all, that the
plaintiff had two strategies: to prove discrimination directly or to prove discrimination indirectly by the pretext method. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. But this explanation does not
seem to work because the Court stated in McDonnell Douglas that evidence of a company’s
policies and practices was relevant to proving pretext. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 80405. All this analysis may simply point out that the Court, not wanting to delimit Green’s
ability to prove his case, was a tad sloppy in how it conceptualized and expressed what the
plaintiff had to prove to show pretext.
40. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. The Court cautioned that statistics showing
underrepresentation of blacks in McDonnell Douglas’ workforce, though relevant to
Green’s case, would not alone prove discrimination against Green because Green’s case depended on whether he had individually suffered discrimination. See id. at 805 n.19. Similar to evidence of the company’s practices, such evidence would not seem to bear on the issue of pretext.
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not act arbitrarily,41 and if an employer has a persuasive explanation
for the adverse employment action, he will assert it.42 Thus, if the
plaintiff disproves the employer’s articulated justification for its action, it is more likely than not that discrimination motivated that action.43
The McDonnell Douglas framework simplified the plaintiff’s task
of proving racial discrimination by requiring the defendant to focus
the issue. A plaintiff, who might otherwise flounder trying to come
up with facts to support his case, will prevail by disproving the defendant’s articulated reason. McDonnell Douglas created the presumption that such disproof demonstrates that the defendant’s articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. Although one may
disagree with the wisdom of this approach, it is undeniably ingenious. McDonnell Douglas tamed an otherwise intractable issue.
Twenty years after McDonnell Douglas and more than a decade
after Burdine, a more conservative Supreme Court dulled the impact
of McDonnell Douglas. In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,44 the Supreme Court, while insisting that it was reaffirming McDonnell
Douglas, eviscerated it.45 Initially a correctional officer in a halfway

41. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (noting that employers generally make decisions “with some reason”).
42. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (explaining that the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its action).
43. See Waters, 438 U.S. at 577 (observing that “when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is
more likely than not the employer . . . based his decision on an impermissible consideration
such as race”).
44. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
45. The Court protested its fidelity to McDonnell Douglas: “We may, according to traditional practice, establish certain modes and orders of proof, including an initial rebuttable presumption of the sort we described earlier in this opinion, which we believe
McDonnell Douglas represents.” Id. at 514. It similarly claimed to embrace Burdine: “The
principal case on which the dissent relies is Burdine. While there are some statements . . .
that could be read to support the dissent’s position, all but one of them bear a meaning
consistent with our interpretation, and the one exception is simply incompatible with other
language in the case.” Id. at 515. The Hicks decision, however, clashes with the unambiguous holdings of both precedents. As Justice Souter demonstrated in an incisive dissenting
opinion,
after two decades of stable law in this Court and only relatively recent disruption in some of the Circuits, the Court abandons this practical framework together with its central purpose, which is “to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” Ignoring language to the
contrary in both McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, the Court holds that, once a
Title VII plaintiff succeeds in showing at trial that the defendant has come forward with pretextual reasons for its actions . . . the factfinder still may proceed
to roam the record, searching for some nondiscriminatory explanation that the
defendant has not raised and that the plaintiff has had no fair opportunity to
disprove.
Id. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 255 n.8 (1981)) (citations omitted).
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house, Melvin Hicks had earned a promotion to shift commander.46
His troubles began when he was assigned a new supervisor.47 Escalating disciplinary action culminated in Hicks’ dismissal.48 In response to his discharge, Hicks brought a Title VII claim for racial
discrimination.49 Although he disproved the two reasons that St.
Mary’s had articulated at step two, namely the frequency and severity of his insubordination, the district court judge, acting as the trier
of fact, ruled against him, concluding that personal animosity, rather
than racial prejudice, accounted for the dismissal.50 The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning correctly that, under McDonnell Douglas,
Hicks, having disproved both step-two reasons, was entitled to judgment.51
A conservative majority of Supreme Court justices disagreed with
the circuit court, ruling that even if a plaintiff disproves the defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reasons, the plaintiff might
nevertheless lose the case. This newly minted reformulation of
McDonnell Douglas instructed that by disproving the defendant’s articulated reasons a plaintiff merely creates an issue of fact, not entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.52 If this was all McDonnell
Douglas stood for, it was hardly worth the time and effort expended
to create the baroque three-tiered framework.
Hicks also held that any reason in the record for the adverse employment action, even if not specifically articulated as a step-two reason, was proper for jury consideration. In Hicks, as noted, defendant
St. Mary’s step-two reasons were the accumulation and seriousness
of Hicks’ insubordinate conduct.53 Yet the judge found that personal
animosity rather than racial bigotry had incited Hicks’ supervisor to
fire him.54 Thus, as Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent, even if
the plaintiff disproves the step-two reason articulated by the defen46. Id. at 504.
47. Id. at 505-06.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 508.
51. Id.
52. See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the “Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 229 (1997) (reading Hicks as contradicting
McDonnell Douglas by abandoning the proposition that proving pretext necessarily proves
discrimination); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 40 (1996) (recognizing that Hicks’
“elimination of proof of falsity as proof of discrimination has rewritten the McDonnell
Douglas test and lowered an employee’s likelihood of success”); Michael C. Phillips, Note,
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: The Casual Abandonment of Title VII Precedent, 23 CAP.
U. L. REV. 1045, 1065 (1994) (rebuking the Hicks Court for engaging in “disingenuous” reasoning).
53. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505-06.
54. Id. at 508.
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dant, the factfinder may nevertheless seize upon a reason “lurking in
the record” to blindside an unsuspecting plaintiff.55
After Hicks, one wonders what purpose McDonnell Douglas
serves. By remolding the framework into ineffectuality, Hicks has
thwarted the original purpose of the framework: to simplify the task
of proving discriminatory intent.56 Despite the Supreme Court’s solemn assurances that Hicks merely affirmed McDonnell Douglas, the
two cases clash irrevocably.57 The Court’s devotion to stare decisis
and the climate of racial politics probably account for the masquerade.
The deconstruction of McDonnell Douglas pressed on. In Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,58 the Supreme Court further
weakened McDonnell Douglas, holding that, even if the plaintiff carries the burden of disproving the step-two reason, the defendant may
in some cases be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.59 In reach55. Id. at 534-35 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter observed:
[U]nder the majority’s scheme, a victim of discrimination lacking direct evidence will now be saddled with the tremendous disadvantage of having to confront, not the defined task of proving the employer’s stated reasons to be false,
but the amorphous requirement of disproving all possible nondiscriminatory
reasons that a factfinder might find lurking in the record.
Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, responded to this argument by noting that the
articulated reasons do not exist “apart from the record—in some pleading, or perhaps in
some formal, nontestimonial statement made on behalf of the defendant to the factfinder.”
Id. at 522. The articulated reasons “themselves are to be found ‘lurking in the record.’” Id.
at 523. The question is, however, whether the factfinder should be permitted to infer steptwo reasons, though the defendant has not at trial articulated them as such. The majority
held that the factfinder may do so. See id. at 523-24; see also Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters
in Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385, 419-20 (1994) (concluding
that Justice Scalia offered an unsatisfactory response to the dissent’s lurking-in-the-record
argument, but that, as a practical matter, juries will most likely consider only reasons explicitly articulated).
56. See Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic
Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 1003 (1994) (commenting that Hicks questions the assumption of Burdine that discrimination is “more likely than not” the explanation for an
adverse employment action absent an alternative explanation).
57. See Shannon R. Joseph, Note, Employment Discrimination: Shouldering the Burden of Proof After St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 986-87
(1994) (criticizing Hicks for twisting the language of Burdine, abandoning the position of
McDonnell Douglas that a plaintiff is entitled to judgment if he disproves the defendant’s
articulated reason, and replacing that view with the more difficult to prove position that a
plaintiff may be required to produce additional evidence of discrimination).
58. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
59. Id. at 148. Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, asserted that the
combination of proving a prima facie case and disproving the articulated step-two reason
might be insufficient to create a question of fact on the ultimate issue of discrimination.
She stated:
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate
to sustain a jury’s finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where,
although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient
evidence to reject the defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be
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ing this holding, the Court had traveled quite a distance from its initial position in McDonnell Douglas, which held that if plaintiff disproved the step-two reason, plaintiff, not defendant, was categorically entitled to judgment.60 McDonnell Douglas has dwindled to a
useless ritual.61
B. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
By focusing the inquiry on the plaintiff’s ability to prove that the
defendant’s articulated reason was a pretext, McDonnell Douglas
provided a framework for single-motive cases. This framework founders, however, when both a discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
reason have influenced the adverse employment action. Price Waterhouse attempted to supply the missing analytical link.

entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some
other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no
discrimination had occurred.
Id. The first possibility that Justice O’Connor mentions contradicts the majority’s position
in Hicks, which held that all reasons implied in the record are articulated step-two reasons. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522-23. In sharp contrast, the Reeves Court contemplated a
circumstance where “some other nondiscriminatory reason” might win a case for a defendant. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. This pronouncement of the Court vindicates Justice Souter’s
point in his dissent in Hicks—that unarticulated reasons “lurking in the record” might
scuttle an otherwise meritorious discrimination case. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534-35. The second possibility that Justice O’Connor mentions might arise if an employer’s true reason for
the adverse action was embarrassing or even illegal but not discriminatory. Assume, for
example, that a black-owned construction company fired a union organizer who happened
to be black. Loathe to admit a violation of the National Labor Relations Act, the employer
might fabricate a step-two reason, which the plaintiff might easily debunk. If the blackowned company had an exemplary record of hiring African-Americans, and had even
adopted a voluntary affirmative action plan, a rational factfinder would be hard pressed to
determine that the employer discriminated on the basis of race. Admittedly, such a case
would be quite unusual. In the same vein, Justice Ginsburg noted, in a concurring opinion
in Reeves, that “circumstances will be uncommon” for a plaintiff, having disproved the
step-two reason, to be vulnerable to judgment as a matter of law. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 15455 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She urged that when the plaintiff disproves the step-two reason, a finding of discrimination would ordinarily be a reasonable inference thereby rendering judgment as a matter of law inappropriate. Id.
60. The Supreme Court further limited McDonnell Douglas by holding that it does not
establish a pleading standard, but rather creates an evidentiary standard for allocating
burdens of proof. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002), the Court declared that complaints alleging individual disparate treatment must conform merely to the
notice pleading standard prescribed in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
61. The same analysis applies to the fourth element of a refusal-to-hire prima facie
case—that after plaintiff’s rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of plaintiff’s qualification. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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1. The Plurality Decision
Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at the Price Waterhouse accounting firm, applied for partnership.62 Among her qualifications for promotion was the key role she played in securing a multimillion-dollar
contract.63 Both clients and partners of the firm described her as a
professional with integrity, industriousness, and intelligence.64 Nevertheless, the firm’s Policy Board put her application on hold and refused to reconsider her application the following year.65 She responded by filing a claim for sex discrimination.66 In a bench trial,
Judge Gesell found that abrasiveness with staff, an aspect of her behavior conceded even by her supporters, damaged her bid for partnership.67 Judge Gesell also found, however, that sexual stereotyping
influenced the firm’s decision to deny her partnership.68 “One partner
described her as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at
charm school.’”69 Most critically, Thomas Beyer, the partner who explained to Hopkins why the Policy Board had shelved her candidacy
for partnership, told her that she should “walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry.”70
Given this combination of discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
motives, a plurality of the Supreme Court held the McDonnell Douglas framework inappropriate to decide Hopkins’ case.71 McDonnell
Douglas, the plurality observed, operated under the assumption that
either the discriminatory reason or the nondiscriminatory reason,
but not both, caused the adverse employment action.72 The plaintiff’s
principal task under McDonnell Douglas—to prove pretext—could
not apply in a mixed-motives case.73 Such a case required a new regime.
The Price Waterhouse plurality prescribed the applicable standard. First, the plaintiff must prove that discrimination was a moti62. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989), superseded by statute as
stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
63. Id. at 233-34.
64. Id. at 234. Among Hopkins’ qualifications for partnership was a twenty-five million dollar contract she secured with the Department of State. Id. at 233-34.
65. Id. at 231-32.
66. Id. at 232.
67. Id. at 234-35.
68. Id. at 235-37.
69. Id. at 235.
70. Id. Judge Gesell found that, in previous years, female candidates for partnership
fared better if the decision-making partners viewed the candidates as both feminine and
effective. Id. at 236.
71. Id. at 243-47.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 247.
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vating factor for the adverse employment action.74 Once the plaintiff
meets this burden, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant
to prove by a preponderance of evidence that it would have taken the
adverse action based on the nondiscriminatory reason alone.75 In
other words, if one excludes the effects of discrimination, the nondiscriminatory reason would nevertheless have caused the adverse action. By proving this so-called “same-decision” defense, the defendant
escapes liability.76
Congress, however, modified the Price Waterhouse holding. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that once the plaintiff meets the
motivating-factor test, the plaintiff wins.77 Congress transformed the
“same-decision” defense into a means of limiting the range of available remedies to declaratory relief, certain forms of injunctive relief,
costs, and attorney’s fees.78 This statutory “partial defense” precludes
damages, back pay, and reinstatement.79
(a) Mixed-Motive Cases
The Price Waterhouse approach applies to mixed-motive cases,
that is, where, in addition to the discriminatory motive, a nondiscriminatory motive may also have caused the employment action.80
The term “mixed-motive” is misleading, however, because the employer may fail to prove that a nondiscriminatory reason had any influence at all on the adverse employment action. The point is that
when the plaintiff meets the motivating-factor test and thereby becomes entitled to judgment, the employer has the opportunity to
meet the mixed-motive partial defense. The partial affirmative defense is not available when McDonnell Douglas applies because application of the partial defense under such circumstances would
make no sense. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can prevail
only if he disproves the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason.81 If the
plaintiff disproved the defendant’s reason, then the defendant could
never prove by a preponderance of evidence, under Price Waterhouse,

74. Id. at 248-50.
75. Id. This is called the “same-decision” defense. Judge Gesell held that Price Waterhouse could avoid equitable relief by proving the “same-decision” defense by clear and convincing evidence. He found that Price Waterhouse failed to meet this burden. Id. at 237.
Affirming the district court’s ultimate conclusion, the D.C. Circuit ruled that if a defendant
proves the “same-decision” defense by clear and convincing evidence, the defendant wins
the case. Id.
76. Id. at 258.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
78. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
79. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
80. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247.
81. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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that it would have made the adverse employment decision based on
the disproved reason alone.
There is, nevertheless, inevitable confusion between the two approaches because proof of pretext is circumstantial evidence that the
defendant was motivated by discriminatory intent. The Reeves Court
made this very point by stating that “[p]roof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it
can be quite persuasive.”82 The McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse approaches are therefore impossible to separate. Nevertheless,
before Hicks, one could justify the existence of McDonnell Douglas
because that approach entitled a plaintiff who disproved the defendant’s explanation to win. Hicks, however, changed the McDonnell
Douglas approach, rendering disproof of the defendant’s explanation
some, but not necessarily conclusive, evidence of discrimination.83
This change blurred any meaningful distinction between McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse.
In Price Waterhouse, Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion
offering her own formulation for how Price Waterhouse should operate. She suggested that Price Waterhouse applies when direct evidence proves that discrimination was a substantial factor leading to
the adverse employment action.84 Only such powerful evidence, Justice O’Connor reasoned, entitled the plaintiff to shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant to establish the same-decision defense.85
Plaintiffs who rely on circumstantial evidence, as did Green in
McDonnell Douglas, have not earned the right to shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant.86
Price Waterhouse established the motivating factor test, which the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified.87 Remarkably, however, Justice
O’Connor’s viewpoint concerning direct versus circumstantial evidence, though expressed in a concurring opinion, rose to predominance among the circuits. The rationale for adopting Justice O’Connor’s position was that it provided the narrowest ground for the
Court’s decision.88 Unfortunately, this analysis created even more
82. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000); see also
Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that by disproving the employer’s articulated reason the plaintiff has provided some evidence of discrimination); Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that “the factfinder’s rejection of the employer’s proffered evidence [is] circumstantial evidence of unlawful discrimination”).
83. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993).
84. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 278.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
88. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
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confusion. It is entirely possible for a case to be based on circumstantial evidence, and yet for the factfinder to conclude that both the discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons influenced the adverse
employment action. For example, assume that a large company,
which employs hundreds of workers, has never employed a single African-American despite having had many qualified African-American
applicants. An African-American applies for a job opening at this
company. The interviewer, who is the owner of the company, is inexplicably impatient and rude at the job interview, but he does not utter a racial remark. After the interview, he declares to his secretary,
“I wouldn’t hire that guy in a million years.” When his secretary asks
why not, he responds, “I’d better keep my mouth shut. I don’t want to
get myself into trouble.” Ultimately, the job goes to a white applicant
who is even more qualified than the African-American applicant.
Under these facts, both the discriminatory reason and the nondiscriminatory reason (the stronger qualifications of the white applicant) appear creditable. One wonders in such a circumstantial,
mixed-motive case whether McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse
applies.
Another criticism of Justice O’Connor’s position is that circumstantial evidence may be as persuasive as direct evidence.89 Assume
the facts in the above hypothetical except that the African-American
applicant was much more qualified for the job than the successful
white applicant. Absent an explanation difficult to contemplate, such
of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds’”) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). In Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., the
First Circuit stated, “when the Supreme Court rules by means of a plurality opinion (as
was true in Price Waterhouse), inferior courts should give effect to the narrowest ground
upon which a majority of the Justices supporting the judgment would agree. The O’Connor
concurrence fits this profile.” 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), overruled
in part by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003). Other courts, however, have
disagreed with the premise that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion established the rule
of Price Waterhouse. In Thomas v. NFL Players Association, the D.C. Circuit noted that
“Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was one of six votes supporting the Court’s judgment (four
Justices comprised the plurality, and Justice White filed a separate concurrence), so that it
is far from clear that Justice O’Connor’s opinion, in which no other Justice joined, should
be taken as establishing binding precedent.” 131 F.3d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated in
part, 1998 WL 1988451 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25, 1998); see also Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
958 F.2d 1176, 1182-83 (2d Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that the narrowest ground supporting a plurality opinion establishes the law, but concluding that no other Justice concurred
with Justice O’Connor’s view and therefore that her direct-evidence position does not establish the Court’s holding).
89. See Steven M. Tindall, Note, Do as She Does, Not as She Says: The Shortcomings
of Justice O’Connor’s Direct Evidence Requirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332, 367 (1996) (criticizing Justice O’Connor’s direct-evidence
formulation for turning on the type of evidence presented rather than on its probative
value, and noting that statements of the decision-maker preceding the adverse decision
coupled with a powerful statistical showing of discriminatory practices would not support a
motivating-factor charge).
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circumstantial proof of discrimination is overwhelming. In such a
case, one would expect to be entitled to a Price Waterhouse jury instruction, though before Costa the prevailing view required the application of McDonnell Douglas.
(b) Pretext Cases
The plurality’s analysis indicates that the McDonnell Douglas
approach applies to pretext cases, that is, cases where only one reason, either discriminatory or nondiscriminatory, caused the adverse
employment action. There is, however, language in Burdine that
seems at first glance to permit a McDonnell Douglas plaintiff to
prove discrimination by any available evidence, regardless of
whether it bears on pretext. Burdine states that a plaintiff “may succeed . . . either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”90
The italicized portion of the quotation suggests that proving pretext
is only one method of attack under McDonnell Douglas. In other
words, under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs may bypass the burden
of proving pretext and rely instead on “direct” proof, however that
term is defined. The problem is that this interpretation of McDonnell
Douglas cannot co-exist with Price Waterhouse. When, in the words of
Burdine, a plaintiff proceeds “directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer,”91 Price
Waterhouse governs the case. The answer to this apparent contradiction is simply that Price Waterhouse rather than McDonnell Douglas
applies. The Second Circuit in Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. recognized that “the direct method of proof contemplated by the last step
of Burdine is the same as the plaintiff’s initial burden under Price
Waterhouse,” and thus “[w]hen the more focused proof of discrimination is presented, the court need not go through the McDonnell Douglas analysis.”92
Historical context explains why the Supreme Court stated in
Burdine that a plaintiff might succeed directly by proving motivating
factor. When the Supreme Court decided Burdine, Price Waterhouse
was eight years in the future. The Court had not yet confronted a
“mixed-motive” case, that is, a case where the plaintiff proved motivating factor without having to disprove the defendant’s justification
for the adverse employment action. The Court could not foreclose
90. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. 958 F.2d 1176, 1185 (2d Cir. 1992). The court went on to state, “the only difference
is that under Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff begins by focusing on the alleged discrimination itself, while the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine plaintiff starts by focusing on his own
qualifications and the employer’s needs.” Id.
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civil rights plaintiffs from proving discrimination “directly”; that is,
without resort to proof of pretext, because a plaintiff in a particular
case might have other persuasive evidence of discrimination.93 Thus,
the Court kept that option open.
Eight years later, in Price Waterhouse, the Court attempted to
explain, however confusingly, the framework for “mixed-motive”
cases. Because the prevalent view required direct rather than circumstantial evidence to invoke Price Waterhouse, some courts allowed McDonnell Douglas plaintiffs to support their cases with any
circumstantial evidence they had.94 This permissive rule was understandable because Price Waterhouse plaintiffs could not use circumstantial evidence. Unless McDonnell Douglas permitted the use of
such evidence, plaintiffs could not use it at all.
Costa, however, seems to clash with Hicks. Costa allows the use
of circumstantial evidence in Price Waterhouse cases, and Hicks instructs that in some McDonnell Douglas cases the plaintiff will need
circumstantial evidence beyond proof of pretext to carry the case.
Thus, a plaintiff may offer circumstantial evidence of discrimination
under both approaches. Separating the approaches becomes confounding.
One might attempt to reconcile Hicks and Costa in the following
way: If a plaintiff has enough evidence, excluding proof of pretext, to
meet the motivating factor test, Price Waterhouse applies. If, on the
other hand, the plaintiff needs to prove pretext to meet the motivating factor test, McDonnell Douglas applies. When McDonnell Douglas
applies, the plaintiff may use all available proof of discriminatory intent. Such additional evidence (beyond proof of pretext), however,
could not be weighty enough to meet the motivating factor test because, if it did, Price Waterhouse, rather than McDonnell Douglas,
would have applied in the first place. Thus, McDonnell Douglas operates as a fallback position for plaintiffs with weak circumstantial
cases. The problem with this reconciliation is that proof of pretext is
just as persuasive in proving motivating factor under the Price
Waterhouse approach as it is under the McDonnell Douglas approach.
Furthermore, it would be impossible to exclude proof of pretext from
Price Waterhouse cases because the defendant, to establish the partial affirmative defense, would nearly always assert a nondiscrimina93. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. “Directly,” as Burdine used the word, did not denote
direct as opposed to circumstantial evidence, but indicated proof of discrimination not
based on pretext. See id.
94. See, e.g., Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 511-13 (4th Cir. 1994)
(considering all circumstantial evidence in affirming the judgment as a matter of law for
the defendant in an age discrimination case); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29
F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994) (commenting that the sheer weight of circumstantial evidence may prove pretext). But see infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the direct-evidence/pretext
trap, which doomed cases with substantial circumstantial evidence).
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tory reason, which the plaintiff would try to rebut as a matter of tactical necessity. The two approaches inevitably spiral into each other.
They cannot be separated.
There are additional problems with the above-suggested distinction between Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas. Jurors often
disagree on the persuasiveness of evidence. A rational factfinder
might or might not find the evidence in a particular case sufficient to
meet the motivating factor test.95 For example, assume that an interviewer rejects a qualified woman for a managerial position, which
goes to a man. The woman testifies that the interviewer said, “A
woman can’t manage men.” The interviewer denies having made the
remark. If the jury credits the woman’s testimony, Price Waterhouse
would surely apply. If the jury credits the interviewer’s denial,
McDonnell Douglas would apply. Furthermore, now that circumstantial evidence may trigger a Price Waterhouse charge, plaintiffs, who
naturally prefer the burden-shifting benefit of a Price Waterhouse
jury instruction, will inevitably offer numerous facts to bolster their
quest to be entitled to one. Questions of fact, requiring jury consideration, will arise as to whether the totality of the plaintiff’s evidence
meets the motivating factor test.
In all such cases, the judge must instruct the jury in the alternative that Price Waterhouse applies if the jury finds the evidence sufficient to meet the motivating factor test (excluding disproof of the defendant’s justification for the adverse employment action), and that
McDonnell Douglas applies if the jury finds otherwise. As the Third
Circuit recognized in Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., “an employee may
present his case under both theories and the district court must then
decide whether one or both theories properly apply . . . prior to instructing the jury.”96 An alternative charge should make jurors trem95. See Stephen W. Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case
for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371, 388 (1997) (pointing out that, under the position that Price Waterhouse required direct evidence, the jury might disbelieve plaintiff’s
submission of direct evidence). In such cases, since it is impossible for a court to foretell
how the jury will evaluate the evidence, it is likewise impossible for the court to choose between the propriety of a McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse jury instruction. The
same problem occurs even after Costa because a court cannot predict how a jury will assess
circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff offers to meet the motivating factor test.
96. 32 F.3d 768, 781 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994). Professor Michael Zimmer reasons that a
dual charge is inevitable in most cases. He argues:
Once discovery is complete, the trial judge must decide whether there is evidence to support the Price Waterhouse approach, which applies whenever there
is evidence that “both legitimate and illegitimate considerations played a part
in the decision against” the plaintiff. If there is, then the “particular case involves mixed motives.” Because in every McDonnell Douglas case there is the
plaintiff’s evidence that an illegitimate consideration was involved as well as
the defendant’s evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, it would
seem that evidence of more than one motive is present in the record in every
case. . . . With such evidence in the record, the case should be sent to the fact-
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ble. McDonnell Douglas eludes easy understanding when presented
all by itself. Warning that a McDonnell Douglas charge is “unduly
confusing,” the Third Circuit, in Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg,
has taken the extraordinary position that district courts should refrain from giving such a jury instruction, although McDonnell Douglas is controlling law.97 Coupling a McDonnell Douglas charge with a
Price Waterhouse charge burdens lay jurors with levels of complexity
more humanely inflicted on law professors who rejoice in unraveling
legal conundrums.
2. Evidence Sufficient to Support a Price Waterhouse Charge
Before Costa, the circuit courts could not agree on precisely what
sort of evidence sufficed as “direct” evidence. The circuit courts applied numerous analyses, classified loosely into three positions: the
“classic” direct-evidence approach, the “animus plus” approach, and
the “animus” approach.98
The classical approach purports to apply the traditional definition
of direct evidence.99 The traditional definition of direct evidence is
finder, first on the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives theory and then, if the jury
does not find for the plaintiff on that approach, on the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine circumstantial evidence theory.
Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination
and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693, 695-96 (2000) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989)); see also Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171,
185 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the trial judge should have provided the jury with both a
pretext and mixed-motive instruction because the jury, as the trier of fact, might or might
not have reasonably credited both the discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons for an
alleged retaliatory employment action).
97. 147 F.3d 272, 280 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998).
98. See generally Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 582 (1st Cir.
1999) (discussing the three direct-evidence standards and summarizing cases using each
standard), overruled in part by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003); Robert
Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated
View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 662-63 (2000); Christopher Y. Chen, Note, Rethinking the Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach in Analyzing MixedMotives Discrimination Claims, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 908-13 (2001); Joseph J. Ward,
Note, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice O’Connor’s Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Claims, 61 ALB. L. REV. 627, 64857 (1997). Adding to the confusion, the “animus plus” and “animus” approaches broaden
the definition of “direct evidence” to include certain forms of what would ordinarily be considered circumstantial evidence.
99. Although coming close to the classical definition of direct evidence, the statements
in Price Waterhouse required an inference of discrimination. Thomas Beyer, the partner
who informed Hopkins that her application for partnership was put on hold, told her that
her chances would improve if she walked, talked, and dressed more femininely. See Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. To find discrimination, a trier of fact would have to infer that
Beyer’s statement accurately reflected the firm’s decisionmaking process, a probable inference, but an inference nevertheless. Those courts adopting the classical position seem to
follow this slight modification, which allows such an inference. E.g., Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d 60, 65 n.4 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that direct evidence
for purposes of Price Waterhouse means comments by a decisionmaker that demonstrate
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evidence, which if believed, “proves a fact without inference or presumption.”100 Arguably, direct evidence cannot exist in discrimination
cases because such cases require inferring the defendant’s state of
mind. Nevertheless, in discrimination cases, the statement, “I did not
promote you because you are black” would count as direct evidence.
In Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc.,101 the Tenth Circuit adopted this
approach. Shorter, a black woman, was a corporate recruiter for
ICG.102 Having made off-color statements about African-Americans,
Dughman, Shorter’s supervisor, fired her, and a day or two later referred to her as an “incompetent nigger.”103 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for ICG, holding that Dughman statements, as mere expressions of personal animosity, were not direct evidence relating to Shorter’s termination.104
Predominant among the circuit courts, the animus plus standard
requires that a person with influence over the challenged employment decision utter remarks, in connection with the decisionmaking
process, which show discriminatory animus.105 This approach is not
as stringent as the classic approach because to prove “animus plus”
the plaintiff need not prove, for example, that the decisionmaker said
that the employment decision was based on a forbidden criterion, even if “a fertile mind
can conjure up some innocent explanation”); Bass v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 256 F.3d
1095, 1105 (11th Cir. 2001) (adopting the classic position that only blatant remarks demonstrating a decisionmaker’s intent to discriminate in the challenged employment decision
qualify as direct evidence, and rejecting as insufficient the statement of the chief of a fire
and rescue division suggesting racial bias against white applicants for training instructor
positions, because the chief was not a decisionmaker in the hiring process).
100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999).
101. 188 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999).
102. Id. at 1206.
103. Id. Dughman asked Shorter about the size of black men’s sex organs, told another
ICG employee that Shorter spoke like a person of her race, and during a confrontation with
Shorter said, “You are just on the defensive because you are black.” Id.
104. 188 F.3d at 1208; see also, e.g., Thomas v. NFL Players Ass’n, 131 F.3d 198, 204
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating “Justice O’Connor’s invocation of ‘direct’ evidence is not intended
to disqualify circumstantial evidence,” and concluding that the evidence must relate to the
particular employment decision), vacated in part, 1998 WL 1988451 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25,
1998).
105. E.g., Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1999) (accepting
either direct or circumstantial evidence to meet the Price Waterhouse standard if the evidence relates to discrimination in the particular employment decision and concluding that
the jury reasonably found in favor of plaintiff’s retaliation claim based substantially on a
suspension letter referencing plaintiff’s deposition testimony in his racial discrimination
case); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that “evidence of
conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and
that bear directly on the contested employment decision” is necessary for a Price Waterhouse charge, and that evidence of statistical disparities, superior qualifications of the
plaintiff relative to those who were hired, and ambiguous statements during the job interview, did not meet the threshold for such a charge), overruled in part by Desert Palace, Inc.
v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 779-80 (3d Cir.
1994) (labeling the Price Waterhouse evidentiary requirement “overt” evidence and rejecting as inadequate statements of nondecisionmakers and age-related notations on employment documents).
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to the plaintiff, “I am firing you because you are black.” In Mohr v.
Dustrol, Inc., the Eighth Circuit adopted the animus plus approach.106 Dustrol, a paving maintenance company, employed Mohr
as a flagger, a job which required Mohr to control traffic at construction sites.107 Sanchez, her foreman, made pejorative comments about
non-Hispanics and said he preferred an all-Hispanic crew. After finishing the 1998 season, Mohr was not rehired for 1999.108 Because
Sanchez had input into the decision not to rehire Mohr, his comments justified a Price Waterhouse charge, despite the absence of
classical direct evidence of discrimination in the decision not to rehire Mohr.109
The least stringent of the three standards, the animus position
merely requires that someone in the decisionmaking process made
comments exhibiting a discriminatory attitude, even if the comments
were not tied to the adverse decision.110 In Lightfoot v. Union Carbide
Corp., Lightfoot, a chemical engineer, advanced, over the course of
many years, to management positions at Union Carbide.111
Shackelford, a company vice-president who became Lightfoot’s supervisor, criticized Lightfoot’s performance, and ultimately Lightfoot

106. 306 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 2002), overruled in part by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003). The Court distinguished such comments from “‘stray remarks in
the workplace,’ ‘statements by nondecisionmakers,’ or ‘statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process.’” Id. at 640-41 (quoting Rivers-Frison v. Southeast Mo.
Cmty. Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1998)) (citations omitted); see also
Burrell v. Bd. of Trs., 125 F.3d 1390, 1394 (11th Cir. 1997) (espousing the classical position, but probably applying the animus plus position, and holding that statements showing
gender discrimination in the hiring process of Burrel did not show gender discrimination in
her firing).
107. 306 F.3d at 638.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 640-41. Mohr also alleged sex discrimination based on Sanchez’s statement
to Mohr that he was not going to have any females on his crew. Id. at 638. This statement
comes close to meeting the classical definition of direct evidence. Though a finding of discrimination still requires the inference that Sanchez acted upon his stated preference
against women on the job, the inference is a baby step rather than a giant leap.
110. E.g., Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 927 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that evidence of a discriminatory attitude by those involved in the decision to fire a female
officer would support application of the Price Waterhouse standard on a motion for summary judgment, but that Cronquist’s evidence fell short even of this relatively lenient
standard); Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities,
115 F.3d 116, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a “dual motivation” charge requires either direct evidence of discrimination or circumstantial evidence tied directly to the discriminatory animus in question and finding that mere statistical and anecdotal evidence,
such as racial slurs of coworkers and undesirable work assignments, fall short of the standard); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs., 91 F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that
“[s]tatements indicating racial bias on the part of a decisionmaker in an employment setting can constitute direct evidence of racial discrimination,” but finding that racially biased
statements of a nondecisionmaker do not meet this standard), overruled in part by Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
111. 110 F.3d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1997).
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was terminated as part of a reduction-in-force initiative.112 Lightfoot
brought a claim for age discrimination.113 The jury received a mixedmotives instruction, which Union Carbide challenged on appeal.114
The Second Circuit held such an instruction appropriate when ‘“conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process . . . may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.’”115 The court ruled a mixed-motive instruction proper
in Lightfoot based, in part, on Lightfoot’s testimony that Shackelford
expressed disbelief that Lightfoot wished to continue working until
the age of seventy.116 The court was also impressed by the testimony
of Dr. Cellura, a former employee of Union Carbide who participated
in the meeting that resulted in Lightfoot’s discharge.117 Cellura testified that Union Carbide took a “particular interest in young talented
people.”118 Such evidence would not have met the classic definition of
direct evidence, nor would it have met the animus plus test.119
In Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected all three
of these approaches, concluding instead that, regardless of the formulation, direct evidence was not necessary for Price Waterhouse to apply.120 The court noted that § 2000e-2(m), the provision which codified
the motivating factor test, did not so much as mention any directevidence requirement to trigger that test.121 Thus, the court concluded that any evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, entitled a

112. Id. at 903-04.
113. Id. at 904.
114. Id. at 913.
115. Id. at 913 (quoting Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir.
1992)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 911-12.
118. Id. at 913.
119. It is doubtful that such evidence met the standard that Justice O’Connor endorsed
in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse. After commenting that stray remarks are
insufficient to meet her direct-evidence requirement, she also added, “[n]or can statements
by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden in this regard.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring), superseded by statute as stated in
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
120. 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003); see also Wright v.
Southland Corp. 187 F.3d 1287, 1294, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 1999) (defining “direct evidence,”
for purposes of discrimination cases, as “evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, a causal link between an adverse employment action and a protected personal characteristic,” and finding that statements of decisionmakers, three months before plaintiff’s termination, that plaintiff was too old for the job and
that the company was looking for younger store managers met the evidentiary test); Tyler
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1185 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that “[w]hen a case
is submitted to a jury, and the jury then concludes that a preponderance of all of the evidence (of whatever kind) shows that age was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision,
that is enough for the jury to shift its glance to the employer and require it to prove its affirmative defense”).
121. Costa, 299 F.3d at 851.
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plaintiff to the application of Price Waterhouse as long as the evidence demonstrated that illegal discriminatory intent motivated the
adverse employment action.122
This split among the circuits created a chaotic body of law governing individual disparate treatment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Costa to resolve the issue whether Price Waterhouse applied only when a plaintiff presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent.123
III. DESERT PALACE, INC. V. COSTA: AN ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,124 the Supreme Court confronted
the issue whether a Title VII plaintiff must present direct evidence of
discrimination to be entitled to a mixed-motive jury charge. Justice
Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected the proposition that
direct evidence was necessary,125 announcing that circumstantial evidence could be sufficient.126 If the plaintiff presents proof, whether
circumstantial or direct, that might persuade a reasonable jury that
the employer’s adverse decision was motivated by discrimination, the
plaintiff is entitled to a mixed-motive jury instruction. Although the
Court was correct, it left open the ultimate issue: the role of the motivating factor test as the unified approach to all individual disparate-treatment employment-discrimination cases.
A. The Unanimous Opinion
1. Facts and Procedural Background
Caesar’s Palace Hotel & Casino employed Catharina Costa as a
warehouse worker and heavy equipment operator.127 Involved in a series of conflicts with management and her co-workers, Costa was the
object of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial
of privileges, and suspension.128 When she clashed physically with a
co-worker, Herbert Gerber, management fired Costa, while only suspending Gerber for five days.129 The rationale for the discrepancy in
punishment was that, prior to the conflict with Costa, Gerber had
had a spotless disciplinary record.130 Costa brought a claim for sex
discrimination and sexual harassment in which she alleged that: (1)
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 853-54.
123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 2150.
See id. at 2154-55.
Id. at 2152.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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one of her supervisors had stalked her, (2) she received harsher punishment than male co-workers for nearly identical misconduct, (3)
she was treated less favorably than men regarding overtime assignments, (4) her supervisors “stacked” her disciplinary record, and (5)
her supervisors used or tolerated sexual slurs against her.131
The district court instructed the jury, without objection, that the
“plaintiff has the burden of proving . . . by a preponderance of the
evidence that she suffered adverse work conditions and that her sex
was a motivating factor in any such work conditions imposed on
her.”132 The court also instructed the jury:
However, if you find that the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff
was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must decide
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff’s gender had played no role in the employment decision.133

Caesar’s Palace objected unsuccessfully to this instruction on the
ground that plaintiff had not offered direct evidence that sex discrimination was a motivating factor for her dismissal or other adverse employment actions.134 The jury found for Costa, awarding her
backpay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages.135
After a panel of Ninth Circuit judges vacated the District Court’s
judgment, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reinstated it.136 The en
banc panel held that § 2000e-2(m) does not require direct evidence to
support a mixed-motives instruction.137 Circumstantial evidence
might provide the evidentiary basis for such a charge.138
2. The Reasoning of the Supreme Court
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Caesar’s Palace argued that
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse, which
predicated a mixed-motive instruction on direct evidence of discrimination, was the holding of the case.139 Caesar’s Palace also asserted
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2152 (alteration in original) (quoting Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838,
858 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003)).
133. Id. (quoting Costa, 299 F.3d at 858).
134. Id. at 2152-53.
135. Id. at 2153.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. Four judges of the en banc panel dissented, relying heavily on the reasoning of the prior three-judge panel, which had held that a plaintiff is entitled to a mixedmotive instruction only when he or she presents “substantial evidence of conduct or statements by the employer directly reflecting discriminatory animus.” Id. (citation omitted).
139. Id.
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that § 2000e-2(m) had not altered that aspect of the Price Waterhouse
holding. Thus, Caesar’s Palace argued that the district court in Costa
should have instructed the jury that to be entitled to a mixed-motive
charge, Costa had to present direct evidence sufficient to persuade
the jury that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor for her
discharge.140 The Court held, however, that, regardless of Justice
O’Connor’s pronouncement in Price Waterhouse, § 2000e-2(m) imposed no requirement for direct evidence.141
The statutory text provided the starting point for Justice Thomas’
analysis. Section 2000e-2(m) states that a plaintiff must “demonstrate” that an employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.142
Justice Thomas observed that since the statute did not even mention
“direct evidence,” it harbored no ambiguities.143 By the clear terms of
the statute, circumstantial evidence could satisfy the evidentiary requirement.144
To support his conclusion, Justice Thomas noted that § 2000e(m)
defines ‘“demonstrate[]’” as ‘“meet[ing] the burdens of production and
persuasion.’”145 If Congress had intended the word “demonstrate” in §
2000e(m) to impose a greater evidentiary burden, it would have
stated its intentions.146 Justice Thomas went on to show that in other
contexts where Congress established heightened evidentiary standards, Congress expressed its intentions unequivocally. An alien, for
example, in an application for asylum, must demonstrate by “clear
and convincing evidence” that the application was filed within one
year from the applicant’s arrival in the United States.147 The absence
of such an unequivocal expression in § 2000e-2(m) showed the lack of
congressional intent to adopt a heightened standard in employment
discrimination cases.148
Justice Thomas reasoned that in other instances where the word
“demonstrate” appeared in Title VII, that word implied the use of circumstantial as well as direct evidence.149 Significantly, § 2000e5(g)(2)(B) requires that for an employer to derive the benefit of the
partial affirmative defense it must “demonstrat[e] that [it] would

140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 2154 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000)).
146. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000)).
147. Id. Similarly, where a whistleblower sues an employer for retaliation under the
Atomic Energy Act, the whistleblower is not entitled to relief if the employer demonstrates
by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel
action in the absence of whistleblowing. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
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have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”150 The employer may make this showing by adducing
either circumstantial or direct proof. To saddle the employee with a
heightened burden of proof, while placing a lower burden on the employer in the same case, would be inconsistent.151 The Court would
not impose such disparate burdens of proof without congressional directive, particularly given the rule of statutory construction holding
that identical words appearing in close proximity in the same statute
should be accorded the same meaning.152
Absent an express statutory instruction to the contrary, the conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply to discrimination
cases.153 Justice Thomas pointed out that there was no sound reason,
statutory or otherwise, to depart from the conventional rule of allowing a plaintiff to proceed with circumstantial evidence.154 Adherence
to this rule made sense to the Court because circumstantial evidence
may be as persuasive, if not more persuasive, than direct evidence.155
Justice Thomas found further support for his view. Juries are routinely instructed that the law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.156 Even in criminal cases where the
standard for conviction is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence alone may support a guilty verdict.157 Finally, Caesar’s Palace had not presented the Court with a single instance
where, absent an express statutory directive, the Court had adopted
a direct-evidence requirement.158
Accordingly, to be entitled to a mixed-motives charge, “a plaintiff
need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,” that unlawful discrimination under Title VII was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action.159 Such evidence may be direct or circumstantial.160

150. Id. at 2154-55 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
(2000)).
151. Id. at 2155.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 2154-55.
154. Id. at 2154.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2155.
160. Id. Because the Court ruled that circumstantial evidence could support a mixedmotive charge, it did not address the second question on which it had granted certiorari:
“What are the appropriate standards for lower courts to follow in making a direct evidence
determination in ‘mixed-motive’ cases under Title VII?” Id. at 2155 n.3 (citations omitted).
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3. Justice O’Connor’s Concurring Opinion
Justice O’Connor, whose concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse
had sparked the controversy leading to the Costa case, joined in the
Costa Court’s opinion. Understandably, she wrote a concurring opinion in Costa to explain her views.161 She insisted that the Price
Waterhouse Court had adopted her position: A plaintiff must ‘“demonstrate by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role’ in an adverse employment decision.”162 She conceded,
however, that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had abrogated that formulation with a new rule requiring that the plaintiff merely prove, by
direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant was motivated
by discriminatory intent.163
B. Implications of the Decision
1. Eliminating the Direct Evidence/Pretext Trap
By permitting plaintiffs to establish motivating factor with circumstantial evidence, Costa eliminated a trap that has scuttled arguably meritorious claims. The problem was that a plaintiff might
have had neither sufficient direct evidence to qualify for a Price
Waterhouse charge, nor sufficient evidence to prove pretext under
McDonnell Douglas. Yet the plaintiff might have had sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination to persuade a jury that he suffered unlawful discrimination.164 Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc.,165 is a
161. Id. at 2155 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 275 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
163. Id.
164. In Heim v. Utah, Heim, a female construction technician employed as an office
worker by the Utah Department of Transportation, alleged in a sex discrimination suit
that she was denied field experience in areas such as field lab, survey, and inspection. 8
F.3d 1541, 1543 (10th Cir. 1993). Since male workers were not allowed greater access than
was Heim to varied field experience, the trial court ruled that Heim failed to establish a
prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 1546. Heim offered testimony that, in response to problems she had with ticket books, Tischner, her supervisor, declared, “Fucking
women, I hate having fucking women in the office,” and that shortly after the outburst, he
retracted permission for Heim to undertake a temporary field assignment. Id. Characterizing Tischner’s remark as “inappropriate and boorish,” the Tenth Circuit interpreted the
remark as an expression of “personal opinion,” rather than direct evidence of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the defendant. Id.
at 1547; see also Robin v. Espo Eng’g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1089-92 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment for the employer because statements plaintiff’s boss made two
years before firing plaintiff that plaintiff was “getting too old” and that he was “an old
S.O.B.” were not direct evidence, and because the plaintiff could not prove that his termination for declining sales performance was pretextual); Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54
F.3d 1207, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming jury verdict for defendants despite numerous
age-biased statements of supervisors, including a statement that a plaintiff would have a
“good case of age discrimination” and another statement that the company wanted to replace a plaintiff with a “younger and cheaper” engineer, because such statements were not
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poignant example. Because the Tenth Circuit characterized Dughman’s statement that Shorter was an “incompetent nigger”166 as mere
personal opinion rather than direct evidence of discrimination,
Shorter had to resort to the McDonnell Douglas framework.167 ICG’s
articulated reason for firing Shorter was inadequate job performance,
a charge which ICG supported with substantial evidence.168 Shorter,
in turn, offered several e-mails to reflect her satisfactory performance, but the court found her evidence inadequate to rebut the charge
of job incompetence.169 Finally, Shorter argued that Dughman’s racially biased statements, even if not direct evidence of discrimination,
constituted circumstantial evidence demonstrating pretext.170 The
court rejected this argument because Shorter could not connect the
statements to Dughman’s decision to fire her.171 The court therefore
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to ICG.172
Caught between the direct-evidence requirement of Price Waterhouse
and the pretext requirement of McDonnell Douglas, Shorter could not
get to a jury despite Dughman’s racial slurs, which might have persuaded a jury that racism motivated Dughman when she fired
direct evidence and because the plaintiffs could not satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test);
Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 509-13 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence of discriminatory intent including the statement of the company vice-president who
fired plaintiffs that “there comes a time when we have to make way for younger people,”
was legally insufficient because the statement was made two years before the firings, and
consequently, upsetting a jury verdict for plaintiffs because the evidence was insufficient
as a matter of law to establish motivating factor or to prove that economic necessity was a
pretext for discrimination); cf. Indurante v. Local 705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d
364, 366-67 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that statements of decisionmakers “to get rid of all the
Italians,” and that “all the Italians were going to be fired,” did not raise an inference of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas because the statements were made many months
before the plaintiff’s termination).
165. 188 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999).
166. Id. at 1206.
167. Id. at 1208.
168. Id. Patricia Lawrence, the person who hired Shorter as a corporate recruiter, testified that Shorter lacked recruiting skills and contacts. Id. at 1208-09. Dughman, who replaced Lawrence, testified that several ICG executives complained that Shorter had provided them with inadequate data about the number of job openings at ICG. Clients also
complained that Shorter did not follow through after meetings with them. John Field,
Dughman’s supervisor, also received numerous complaints about Shorter’s job performance, including Shorter’s failure to locate qualified candidates and follow up on her recruiting duties. Another employee of ICG testified that Shorter misfiled and lost resumes, failed
to arrange for the payment of advertising invoices, and neglected to list job openings in her
reports to management. Id. at 1209.
169. Id. at 1209. The court found that only two of the e-mails arguably supported
Shorter’s attempt to disprove job incompetence and that Shorter received both before most
of the complaints against her arose. Also, Shorter cited testimony of another employee of
ICG who expressed surprise at Shorter’s discharge, but he explained that he was surprised
only because he had never heard any complaints against her, adding that he had no basis
to evaluate her performance. Id.
170. Id. at 1209-10.
171. Id. at 1210.
172. Id. at 1206.
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Shorter. Since, under Costa, circumstantial evidence may support a
Price Waterhouse instruction, one would expect that plaintiffs with
creditable circumstantial cases would survive summary judgment
motions.
2. The Death of McDonnell Douglas?
By allowing both circumstantial and direct evidence to support a
“mixed-motive” analysis, the Costa Court may have foreshadowed the
death of McDonnell Douglas. Even before Costa, the Supreme Court
in Hicks and later in Reeves diluted McDonnell Douglas into ineffectuality by holding that if a plaintiff disproves the defendant’s explanation, the defendant might nevertheless win. McDonnell Douglas
remained necessary only because it governed circumstantial cases.
Now that Costa has held that the circumstantial evidence may be
used under the Price Waterhouse framework, one must question
whether McDonnell Douglas serves any purpose at all.
McDonnell Douglas enables the plaintiff to prevail by proving
that the defendant’s justification was a pretext for discrimination.
Disproof of the defendant’s reason may persuade the jury that the defendant discriminated. Alternatively, the jury may, in its discretion,
require additional proof of discrimination before it finds for the plaintiff. In other words, proof of pretext is circumstantial evidence of discrimination, but it is not necessarily conclusive evidence. Similarly,
under the Price Waterhouse approach, the plaintiff may offer the
same proof of pretext, and the jury may exercise its discretion in
evaluating that evidence. The two approaches do not differ in how
they require the factfinder to evaluate proof of pretext.
Only one arguable justification for McDonnell Douglas remains.
After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas, the defendant must articulate a nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action. Because a defendant will lose the
case if it fails to meet this simple burden of production, defendants
will always articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for their conduct.
Arguably, by forcing the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason, McDonnell Douglas enhances the plaintiff’s chances of proving his case because, as a result of the defendant’s burden of production, the plaintiff will have the opportunity to disprove the defendant’s articulated reason, thereby providing at least some evidence of
discrimination, which, along with plaintiff’s other evidence, may
support a judgment for the plaintiff.
Compelling the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason, however, fails to justify McDonnell Douglas. Price Waterhouse
effectively forces defendants to articulate and prove the efficacy of a
nondiscriminatory reason. Unless a defendant can defeat a weak case
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on a summary judgment motion, the defendant will offer a nondiscriminatory reason to establish the partial affirmative defense. Thus,
under Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff will ordinarily get a full opportunity to prove pretext. In any event, defendants, as a matter of tactical necessity, will nearly always articulate and attempt to prove a
nondiscriminatory reason, even absent the injunction of McDonnell
Douglas. If defendants made no such showing, they would leave a
void in the minds of the factfinder. Any judge or jury would assume
that if the defendant had a valid business justification for the adverse employment decision, he would have presented it at trial. A defendant’s failure to produce such evidence will ordinarily evoke a
negative inference. McDonnell Douglas, however, imposes a significant risk on the plaintiff. If a plaintiff fails to disprove a defendant’s
articulated explanation, the defendant is entitled to judgment.
Unlike McDonnell Douglas, Price Waterhouse does not require plaintiffs to disprove the defendant’s discriminatory reason. McDonnell
Douglas therefore penalizes the plaintiff without affording him a
meaningful benefit.
In rare cases the defendant may not wish to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason. The real reason for firing a plaintiff might embarrass a defendant. Such a reason might, for example, be nepotism
in violation of company policy. The real reason might be improper or
illegal but nondiscriminatory. For example, an African-American
employee might have been fired for filing a workers’ compensation
claim. Such an improper firing is not discriminatory and therefore
does not violate civil rights law.173 In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, the
Supreme Court held that firing a sixty-two year old worker to prevent his pension from vesting, although a violation of ERISA, did not
constitute age discrimination.174 This is not to say that it is acceptable to fire someone because his pension is about to vest, but such a
firing does not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). All parties to lawsuits should have the right to present
whatever evidence they deem appropriate.175 Defendant’s failure to
173. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993).
174. Id. The Court reached this conclusion although age correlates with pension vesting. The Court noted, however, if an employer used pension vesting as a proxy for age,
meaning that the employer intended to discriminate against protected workers and inferred that those workers approaching the time that their pensions would vest must be
“older” workers, such evidence would support an age discrimination claim. Id. at 612-13.
The Court also pointed out that if a worker were fired both to prevent a pension from vesting and for age bias, the worker would have a claim for age discrimination. Id.
175. Though relatively rare, a number of reasons might account for an employer’s reluctance to articulate a valid, nondiscriminatory reason.
The employer may indeed have not gotten along with the fired employee. A
prudent litigant might refrain from raising this explanation because a jury
might wrongly infer pretext from it. Strategy might preclude the employer from
articulating other legitimate reasons that motivated the challenged action. The
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present a nondiscriminatory reason should not compel a finding of
discrimination. Such a failure should be merely one indication of discrimination that the factfinder may evaluate along with all the other
evidence. If, for example, an African-American-owned business actively recruited and hired African-American employees at all levels,
it would be absurd for a factfinder to sustain a claim of racial discrimination against the firm merely because the firm opted not to
present a nondiscriminatory reason for its refusal to hire a single African-American.
Under Price Waterhouse, the jury may, and generally will, view a
defendant’s failure to provide a nondiscriminatory reason as circumstantial evidence of discrimination, or in rare cases the jury may not
find such a failure to be probative as might well be appropriate in the
above hypothetical. Such flexibility advances the factfinder’s mission
to determine whether the defendant engaged in illegal discrimination. McDonnell Douglas therefore does more to hinder than help the
jury in determining the ultimate issue.
3. Judicial Attempts to Explain Costa
Some judges believe that Costa solves this problem. In Dare v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,176 for example, Judge Magnuson concluded
that McDonnell Douglas did not survive Costa. Dare alleged that
Wal-Mart refused to hire her because of her race.177 Characterizing
Dare’s claim as alleging a “single motive,” Judge Magnuson recognized that, by the plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
motivating factor test applies to single-motive and mixed-motive
cases.178 In other words, the motivating factor test is the universal
causation standard for individual disparate treatment cases. Judge
Magnuson noted that McDonnell Douglas presumes that either the
alleged discriminatory reason or defendant’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason caused the adverse decision. He also pointed out
that if the plaintiff fails to disprove the defendant’s step-two reason,
the defendant wins. This possibility, Judge Magnuson concluded, violates the motivating factor test of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because it is possible for a plaintiff to fail to disprove the defendant’s

employer might perceive vague but true reasons as unpersuasive and suggestive of pretext. Embarrassing reasons might shun revelation. Employers might
conceal reasons arguably exposing them to other civil liability. Offensive reasons, even if legitimate, might incite the jury’s disapproval.
Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 759 (1995).
176. 267 F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003).
177. Id. at 990.
178. Id. at 990-91.
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articulated justification while being able to prove that discriminatory
intent motivated the defendant.179
Judge Magnuson’s analysis is technically correct,180 but the consequences are not as dire as he suggests. It is true that if a plaintiff
elects to invoke McDonnell Douglas, he will lose the case if he is unable to disprove the defendant’s articulated reason. But a plaintiff
will not invoke McDonnell Douglas unless he believes that proving
pretext is essential to his discrimination case. In other words, the
plaintiff’s case is so weak that he probably cannot meet the motivating factor test without disproving the defendant’s reason. Such a
plaintiff invokes McDonnell Douglas to compel the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason. If a plaintiff with so little evidence of discrimination fails to disprove the defendant’s reason, the
plaintiff should lose the case. Of course, the defendant would most
likely offer a nondiscriminatory explanation in any event, thereby
making the use of McDonnell Douglas superfluous.
In Thomas v. Chrysler Financial, LLC,181 Judge Shadur, unlike
Judge Magnuson, found room for McDonnell Douglas in the postCosta world.182 Thomas, an African-American woman who was a cus179. Id. Judge Magnuson stated: “[W]hen a defendant prevails under the McDonnell
Douglas scheme, the court is left with a classic mixed-motive scenario, in which both alleged motives could have factored into the defendant’s ultimate employment decision.” Id.
at 992.
180. See Griffith v. Des Moines, 2003 WL 21976027, at *12 (S.D. Iowa July 3, 2003)
(agreeing with Judge Magnuson’s analysis in Dare, and suggesting that McDonnell Douglas has served its purpose and should be abandoned); Thomas v. Chrysler Fin. LLC, 278 F.
Supp. 2d 922, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (suggesting that “if an employee can raise an inference of
discrimination by satisfying the initial elements of a [McDonnell Douglas] prima facie case,
an employer may not necessarily escape liability altogether by offering an alternative explanation for its action”). But see Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F.
Supp. 2d 1180, 1194 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (noting that “there is some uncertainty among the
lower courts as to whether or not Desert Palace and § 2000e-2(m) apply to ‘single-motive’
cases as well as ‘mixed-motive’ cases, and whether or not Desert Palace spells the demise of
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm”).
181. 278 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
182. See id. at 926. See also Williams v. Memphis, wherein Judge Donald, finding
McDonnell Douglas viable after the Costa decision, stated, “A violation of Title VII, however, may be proved other than through McDonnell Douglas/Burdine.” 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17620, at *15 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2003). Employed as a vehicle examiner for the
City of Memphis, Williams, who was disciplined for numerous infractions and ultimately
fired by her supervisor, Terence McBride, brought a sex discrimination claim for wrongful
discharge. Memphis moved for summary judgment, relying solely on Williams’ lack of direct evidence and her inability to meet the McDonnell Douglas standard. Id. at *2-3. After
citing Costa, Judge Donald observed that “[a]lthough plaintiff has not alleged direct evidence of sex discrimination, she has presented circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether sex played a motivating factor in her inability
to use her seniority to bid on positions.” Id. at *16. Judge Donald denied Memphis summary judgment because Williams offered evidence that McBride had “messed” with her for
years and had difficulties with her because of her sex. Id. at *17. For purposes of a summary judgment motion, this evidence met the motivating factor test. See id. Presumably,
Judge Donald would have applied McDonnell Douglas if Williams had not presented suffi-
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tomer service supervisor for Chrysler Financial, sought a transfer to
a credit analyst position to avoid a layoff.183 When Chrysler Financial
rejected her for the two open credit analyst positions, she brought a
race discrimination claim.184 Chrysler Financial moved for summary
judgment.185 Finding that Thomas had no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to meet the motivating factor test, Judge Shadur applied
McDonnell Douglas.186 Because Thomas lacked the experience required for a credit analyst position and because the two individuals
who got the open positions had the required experience, Judge
Shadur concluded that Thomas could not make out a prima facie
case, and he therefore granted Chrysler Financial summary judgment.187
Judge Shadur’s analysis fails to recognize that proof of pretext is
circumstantial evidence of discrimination, and that Costa makes such
evidence relevant to a Price Waterhouse analysis. Moreover, Price
Waterhouse establishes the partial affirmative defense whereby the
defendant may prove that the nondiscriminatory reason was the butfor cause of the adverse employment action. The defendant will attempt to prove that the nondiscriminatory reason caused the adverse
employment action, and the plaintiff will attempt to disprove that
reason. Thus, proof of pretext is an essential part of the Price Waterhouse approach.
Given the battered condition of McDonnell Douglas after Costa,
the fundamental question is whether McDonnell Douglas should be
discarded. As Part IV shows, the motivating factor test of § 2000e2(m) is the Atlas capable of shouldering all individual disparate
treatment cases.
IV. SYNTHESIZING THE TWO APPROACHES
Jurists and scholars have struggled with how to integrate all disparate treatment cases into a unified framework. This Part discusses
and criticizes several such attempts, and concludes that the most effective synthesis is the Price Waterhouse structure as modified by §
2000e-2(m) and Costa.

cient circumstantial evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that discrimination
was a motivating factor that contributed to her dismissal.
183. Thomas, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 924.
184. Id. at 924-25.
185. Id. at 923.
186. Id. at 925-26.
187. Id. at 928.
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A. Section 2000e-2(m) and the Motivating Factor Test
Section 2000e-2(m) provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice.”188 By its very terms, this section applies
not only to Price Waterhouse-type cases, but it applies to any individual disparate treatment case.189 In Costa, the Supreme Court ruled
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
189. In Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies to all
individual disparate treatment cases, thereby abolishing McDonnell Douglas. 207 F.3d
207, 211 (3d Cir. 2000). Concluding that section 107 applies only to mixed-motives cases,
the court relied on several arguments. First, the court reasoned that, by establishing liability when the plaintiff demonstrates “motivating factor . . . even though other factors also
motivated [the] practice,” the language of the section applied specifically to mixed-motives
cases. Id. at 217 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This argument, however, is unpersuasive. If Congress meant to establish a single standard for individual disparate treatment cases by applying section 107 unqualifiedly, it certainly meant also to preserve the
partial affirmative defense. Second, the court emphasized the section’s use of the word
“demonstrates,” observing that Justice O’Connor repeatedly used this word in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse. The court linked the use of the word “demonstrates” to
mixed-motives cases because “demonstrates” suggests a heightened burden of proof and
the mixed-motives, direct-evidence requirement is such a burden. Thus, the court inferred
congressional intent to apply section 107 to the sort of case Justice O’Connor had referred
to, namely, the mixed-motives case. Id. at 217-18. This argument fails because the word
“demonstrates” appears in other provisions of Title VII. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
123 S. Ct. 2148, 2154 (2003) (stating that “use of the term ‘demonstrates’ in other provisions of Title VII tends to show further that § 2000e-2(m) does not incorporate a direct evidence requirement,” and citing § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) as well as § 2000-5(g)(2)(B), which establish the partial affirmative defense). Third, the court pointed to legislative history,
which stressed that Congress intended section 107 to overrule only the part of Price
Waterhouse that established the complete affirmative defense, and that section 107 “‘is
relevant to determine not the liability for discriminatory employment practices, but only
the appropriate remedy.’” Id. at 218-19 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 586 (1991))
(emphasis in original). Although the Third Circuit was correct that section 107 did not alter the standard of liability, the court drew the wrong conclusion. Before and after the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, a single standard of liability applied to all individual disparate treatment cases—the motivating factor test. McDonnell Douglas does not contradict that test.
Although McDonnell Douglas appeared to create a heightened proof standard, it merely
provided an alternative method for meeting the motivating factor test by way of inference.
Thus, the House Report merely confirmed what was self-evident—that a single standard
applies to all individual disparate treatment cases, and that the standard is the motivating
factor test. There are two routes to meet the test: McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse. This point renders the Third Circuit’s inquiry misguided. Section 107 applies to
McDonnell Douglas while preserving it. Fourth, the Third Circuit cited Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994), in which the Supreme Court stated in dictum that
section 107 sets the “standards applicable in ‘mixed-motives’ cases.” Watson, 207 F.3d at
219 (citations omitted). This dictum shrinks to insignificance given the Costa Court’s express reservation of this very issue. In Costa, the Supreme Court stated: “This case does
not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 [sic] applies outside of the mixed-motives context.” 123 S. Ct. at 2151 n.1; see Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1997) (deciding that section 107
does not apply to all discrimination cases, based partly on the House Committee report,
which “makes clear” that the purpose of section 107 was merely to limit the scope of the
“same-decision” defense). But see Benjamin C. Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating Factor

894

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:859

that § 2000e-2(m) applies to both circumstantial and direct-evidence
cases principally because the text of the section contained no limiting
language. The Court observed that if Congress had meant for §
2000e-2(m) to apply only to direct-evidence cases, it would have said
so.190 Like reasoning demonstrates that the section applies to
McDonnell Douglas-type cases. If Congress had meant § 2000e-2(m)
to apply only to Price Waterhouse-type cases, it would have made its
intentions clear. Since the words of the statute are unambiguous, the
inquiry, according to the reasoning of the Costa Court, is “complete.”191
Although unnecessary under the Court’s reasoning, resort to legislative history supports the conclusion that § 2000e-2(m) applies to
all individual disparate treatment cases. The House Report on the
bill destined to become the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides:
To establish liability under proposed Subsection 703(1) [§ 2000e2(m)], the complaining party must demonstrate that discrimination actually contributed or was otherwise a factor in an employment decision or action. Thus, in providing liability for discrimination that is a “contributing factor,” the Committee intends to restore the rule applied in many federal circuits prior to the Price
Waterhouse decision that an employer may be held liable for any
discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested
employment decision.192

This report does not limit § 2000e-2(m) to “mixed-motive” cases.
Rather, it suggests that the new section would establish the “contributing factor” test, which is functionally equivalent to the “motivating
factor” test, in all employment discrimination cases. The Supreme
Court must have been aware of the broad potential reach of the section when it stated in Costa that “[t]his case does not require us to
decide when, if ever, § 107 [sic] applies outside of the mixed-motives
context.”193 With this statement, the Court reserved decision on the
issue whether § 2000e-2(m) applies to discrimination cases that do
not involve mixed motives, that is, cases currently governed by the
McDonnell Douglas approach.

Test for Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 MICH. L. REV. 234, 253-62 (2001)
(criticizing the reasoning of the Watson court based on the plain meaning of the text of section 107 and its legislative history). See generally Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 60009 (1996) (arguing, based on the statutory language, the structure of Title VII, and the
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, section 107 applies to all disparate treatment
cases.)
190. Costa, 123 S. Ct. at 2154.
191. Id.
192. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 586 (1991).
193. Costa, 123 S. Ct. at 2151 n.1.
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If § 2000e-2(m) applies to all individual disparate treatment
cases, one might conclude that § 2000e-2(m) implicitly overruled
McDonnell Douglas. It is more likely, however, that Congress had no
such intention. The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to
abolish a series of conservative Supreme Court decisions that a liberal Congress perceived as having weakened the protections of Title
VII.194 Consistent with this liberal agenda of Congress, McDonnell
Douglas, in the pre-Hicks era, was decidedly pro-plaintiff. The House
Report supports the view that Congress meant to perpetuate McDonnell Douglas by stating that § 2000e-2(m) restores the law to its prePrice Waterhouse status, which includes McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine.
It therefore appears that in 1991 Congress envisioned two paths
that plaintiffs could use to prove motivating factor. First, a plaintiff
could invoke Price Waterhouse and use any evidence to meet that
test. Second, the plaintiff could meet the motivating factor test, as a
matter of law, by proving pretext under McDonnell Douglas.195 As
shown below, however, many argue that McDonnell Douglas and
Price Waterhouse establish two different causation standards.
B. Hazen Paper and Determinative Causation
Some courts and scholars, often relying on dictum in Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins,196 interpret the pretext element of McDonnell Douglas
to require the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the “but-for”
cause of the adverse employment action, rather than merely a contributing or motivating factor.197 Hazen Paper, however, did not im194. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Simpson);
see also Michael A. Zubrensky, Note, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence
Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46
STAN. L. REV. 959, 983 n.196 (1994) (discussing the congressional purpose in enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and cataloguing the Supreme Court cases that prompted passage
of the Act).
195. Hicks changed this standard. Now, if the plaintiff disproves the defendant’s articulated explanation, the factfinder generally has the option of deciding for the plaintiff or
the defendant. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993).
196. 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (stating that “a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that [decisionmaking]
process and had a determinative influence on the outcome”).
197. See, e.g., Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 192 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003)
(quoting the district court’s jury instruction, which required the plaintiff, in a sex discrimination case, to prove that “gender was the determinative factor” or “but-for” cause that resulted in her being denied a promotion); Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir.
1995) (en banc) (adopting the determinative-factor test as heightened causation standard);
Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 185 (2d Cir. 1992) (commenting that the
trial court’s “emphasis on the term ‘determinative’ factor . . . indicate[s] that the [trial]
court treated the present matter as simply a pretext case,” and defining a pretext case as
“one in which there was either unlawful motivation or lawful motivation, but not both”);
Robert A. Kearney, The High Price of Price Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct Evidence of
Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 303, 310 (2003) (arguing that two standards of
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pose a heightened burden of proof on civil rights plaintiffs invoking
McDonnell Douglas. Citing Burdine,198 the Hazen Paper Court stated,
“liability depends on whether the protected trait . . . actually motivated the employer’s decision.”199 This pronouncement confirms that
the motivating factor test applies to all individual disparate treatment cases. Later, the Hazen Paper Court remarked: “[A] disparate
treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait
actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.”200 This statement has caused considerable confusion by suggesting to some that the Court adopted the but-for standard. Taken in context, however, the reference to “a determinative
influence” may simply have meant that a discriminatory consideration actually contributed to the adverse employment action. Such an
interpretation would render the Court’s two statements consistent.
The naked phrase “a determinative influence” did not usher in a
new direction in discrimination law. Subsequent statements in the
Hazen Paper majority opinion reinforce the view that the Court did
not mean to supplant the motivating factor test as the standard in
disparate treatment cases. For example, the Hazen Paper Court observed that “inferring age-motivation from the implausibility of the
employer’s explanation may be problematic” when other unsavory
motives were present.201 If the Court meant “but-for causation” rather
than mere “motivation,” it would have said so.
When the Court assessed the facts in Hazen Paper, it did not apply the but-for standard of causation. The Court summed up Biggins’
ADEA wrongful discharge case as consisting of the following tepid
facts: (1) the Hazens made two “isolated” age-related comments not
connected to the firing,202 (2) Hazen Paper insisted that Biggins sign
a confidentiality agreement, and (3) Hazen Paper presented Biggins’
younger replacement with a less onerous agreement.203 The Court
causation coexist in disparate treatment law: the motivating factor test of Price Waterhouse and the determinative or but-for cause standard of McDonnell Douglas); Michael J.
Zimmer, Slicing and Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577,
580 (2001) (espousing the coexistence of the two standards, and contending that once a
plaintiff has met the determinative influence test, the same-decision defense is unavailable
because an event has only one determinative or but-for cause).
198. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
199. 507 U.S. at 610.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
202. Robert Hazen, a co-owner of Hazen Paper, had enrolled the company as a member
at a handball court. He commented to Biggins and another employee one year older than
Biggins that the membership would “not do them much good because they were ‘so old.’”
Co-owner, Thomas Hazen, on another occasion, informed Biggins that the company was
spending extra money on life insurance because Biggins was “so old.” Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1411 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated by 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
203. Id. Robert Hazen demanded that Biggins sign a confidentiality agreement ostensibly because Biggins, who had launched a consulting business, might reveal to competi-
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commented that if Biggins, in addition to these facts, could disprove
the defendant’s explanation for the firing, he might well prevail.204 It
is clear that such a weak factual showing would not meet the stringent “but-for” causation standard. These facts when coupled with the
inference raised by disproving the defendant’s explanation, however,
might well meet the motivating factor test.
In addition to evaluating Biggins’ ADEA claim, the Hazen Paper
Court discussed the standard for awards of liquidated damages under the ADEA.205 The Supreme Court rejected the circuit court’s use
of “the predominant” causation test, holding instead that to be entitled to statutory liquidated damages, a plaintiff did not have to demonstrate that the employer’s conduct was “the predominant, rather
than a determinative, factor in the employment decision.”206 The
Court’s statement implies that predominant causation is not required
to assess ordinary liability in ADEA cases or Title VII cases which
follow the same causation standard as the ADEA. It follows that Title
VII and the ADEA do not require but-for causation to assess ordinary
liability. The explanation is straightforward. When a but-for cause is
removed, the outcome is eliminated.207 If discrimination were shown
in a particular case to be the but-for cause of the adverse employment
action, no other cause could simultaneously act as a but-for cause,
because if discrimination were removed the adverse employment action would not have occurred. The Hazen Paper Court announced,
however, that a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case need not prove
that discrimination was the predominant cause. This means that the
plaintiff may prevail although a cause other than discrimination was
the predominant cause, which is impossible if discrimination was the
but-for cause. For example, assume that Bill, an African-American,
proves that but for his race his employer would not have fired him. It
would be logically impossible for the employer to prove that but for
insubordination he would not have fired Bill. Once Bill demonstrates
that race was the but-for cause of the firing, he has necessarily
shown that race was the predominant cause.
One can speculate why the Hazen Paper Court used the potentially confusing phrase “a determinative influence.” Burdine stated
that the plaintiff has the opportunity, at step three, to show that the
defendant’s articulated reason for the adverse action was not “the

tors of Hazen Paper confidential information that Biggins had acquired at Hazen Paper.
The confidentiality agreement presented to Biggins’ younger replacement provided for 100
days of severance pay, a benefit not offered to Biggins. Id.
204. The employer’s explanation for the firing was that Biggins had been disloyal by
doing business with Hazen Paper’s competitors. Id.
205. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 617.
206. Id.
207. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 170, at 412-13 (2001).
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true reason” for the challenged decision.208 Price Waterhouse picked
up on this statement and perhaps injudiciously commented that,
unlike a mixed-motive case, Burdine asks the question whether the
plaintiff’s explanation was “the true reason” for the adverse action.209
Disproving that defendant’s reason, however, does not prove the
truth of the plaintiff’s reason.210 Such a standard of proof would be
nearly impossible to meet because it would require the plaintiff to
disprove all alternative explanations. Furthermore, such a burden of
proof amounts to a “sole cause” standard, which both the Supreme
Court and Congress have rejected.211 McDonnell Douglas does not
create a sole cause standard. Nor does it create a but-for standard.
The hyperbolic characterizations of the plaintiff’s burden are metaphorical rather than literal explanations for how the McDonnell
Douglas inference of discrimination works.
According to Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas framework permits
the factfinder to infer discrimination by disproving the defendant’s
alleged nondiscriminatory reason.212 Similarly in Reeves, the Supreme Court held, “the Court of Appeals erred in proceeding from the
premise that a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination [beyond disproving the defendant’s explanation].”213 A mere showing of pretext without additional proof of
discrimination falls short of proving but-for causation. Such a show208. Tex. Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
209. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989), superseded by statute as
stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (alteration in original). The
Court also stated, “the premise of Burdine is that either a legitimate or an illegitimate set
of considerations led to the challenged decision.” Id.
210. See Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme
Court’s Rhetoric and Its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1998) (arguing that Burdine’s characterization of the issue as determining the “true reason” for the adverse employment action distorted a framework that
merely allowed the factfinder to infer discrimination).
211. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-41 (noting that Congress did not intend the
words “because of” in section 703(a)(2) of Title VII to mean “solely because of”); see also 110
CONG. REC. 2728, 13,837 (1964) (rejecting an amendment that would have changed the
section to read, “solely because of”). Even before Hicks modified McDonnell Douglas by
holding that disproving the defendant’s explanation permitted rather than compelled a
finding for the plaintiff, McDonnell Douglas did not actually require the plaintiff to prove
that discrimination was the only cause for the adverse action. If the plaintiff disproved the
defendant’s explanation, a presumption of discrimination arose. This presumption was a
legal construct to help a plaintiff with a weak case. After Hicks, a plaintiff, even having
disproved the defendant’s explanation, may have to offer additional evidence. The quantum of evidence needed, however, when taken together with the prima facie case and disproof of the defendant’s explanation, must meet the motivating factor test, not the determinative influence test.
212. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). The Court noted that the
inference of discrimination may be particularly apt when the factfinder suspects that the
defendant was lying. Id.
213. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000). The Court
also stated, “it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination
from the falsity of the employer’s explanation.” Id. at 147.
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ing, however, permits the factfinder to infer that discrimination was
a motivating factor.214
The Price Waterhouse plurality opinion contradicts the notion
that Hazen Paper established a but-for standard of causation. Interpreting the phrase “because of” in section 703(a)(1) (the principal section outlawing workplace discrimination), the Price Waterhouse plurality declared, “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial
shorthand for ‘but-for causation,’ as does Price Waterhouse, is to
misunderstand them.”215 The Court did not limit its rejection of the
“but-for” standard to mixed-motive cases. Its explanation applied
across the board.216
One cannot argue persuasively that there are two different causation standards governing individual disparate treatment cases. It
is not sensible to vary the legal standard of causation governing a
category of cases based on alternative frameworks. Such a slidingscale standard would be unfair and would lack coherence. Paradoxes
arise when one argues that these contradictory standards exist sideby-side. First, disproving the defendant’s explanation, under Price
Waterhouse, is merely some evidence probative of meeting the motivating factor test. It is absurd to argue that the same evidence carries more weight under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Yet this
paradox would occur if the factfinder held that proof of pretext, without additional proof of discrimination, met the but-for test under
McDonnell Douglas. Second, if direct evidence of discrimination (for
example, “You’re fired because you’re black”) merely establishes that
discrimination was a motivating factor, disproving the defendant’s
explanation, which is less persuasive than direct evidence, cannot
satisfy the more rigorous but-for standard of causation. One might
respond that such direct evidence exceeds the burden imposed by
Price Waterhouse. Nonetheless, before Costa, the overwhelming majority of circuit courts required direct evidence, however they defined
the term, to meet the motivating factor test.
The motivating factor test is the only standard in individual disparate treatment cases, but there are two overlapping approaches to
meet it: McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse. McDonnell Douglas is therefore compatible with the motivating factor test of § 2000e2(m).

214. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
215. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
216. The Price Waterhouse plurality further explained that the “critical inquiry, the
one commanded by the words of § 703(a)(1) [sic], is whether [discrimination] was a factor
in the employment decision at the moment it was made.” Id. at 241 (first emphasis added).
This general explanation of the meaning of section 703(a)(1) applies, by its terms, to all
disparate treatment cases, not only to “mixed-motive” cases. Proving that discrimination
was merely a factor is a far cry from proving that it was a determinative factor.
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Professor Michael Zimmer defends the view that McDonnell
Douglas follows the but-for test. He argues creatively that, although
using the but-for test, McDonnell Douglas is nevertheless consistent
with the motivating factor standard.217 Even in motivating-factor
cases, Professor Zimmer observes, but-for causation enters the mix. If
the plaintiff meets the motivating factor test, the defendant may
limit remedies by proving that its reason was a but-for cause of the
challenged decision.218 Absent such a showing, the plaintiff enjoys the
right to full remedies because discrimination, by default, becomes the
presumptive but-for cause.219 Thus, under both approaches the plaintiff gets full remedies only if discrimination was the but-for cause of
the employment decision.220 Professor Zimmer argues, therefore, that
the effective differences between the approaches are slight.221 He acknowledges, however, that a plaintiff who meets the motivating factor test of Price Waterhouse wins and gets full relief if the defendant
cannot prove the same-decision defense, whereas a plaintiff loses under McDonnell Douglas if he cannot meet the more onerous determinative influence test.222 McDonnell Douglas requires the plaintiff to
disprove the defendant’s reason, whereas Price Waterhouse requires
the defendant to prove it was a but-for cause. This difference in allocating the burden of proof is significant. Plaintiffs and defendants do
battle over who bears this burden of persuasion because outcomes of
cases hang in the balance.
C. McDonnell Douglas As the Universal Framework
One possibility for establishing a unitary framework in all individual disparate treatment cases is to broaden the reach of McDonnell Douglas. Professor Tristin Green takes this approach. She correctly observes that § 2000e-2(m) applies to all individual disparate
treatment cases.223 Emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas Court’s reference to direct as well as indirect proof, Professor Green argues that
McDonnell Douglas covers all individual disparate treatment cases,

217. Michael Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Section 703(m) Governs, Price
Waterhouse Is Dead, Wither McDonnell Douglas? 49 (Nov. 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 50.
220. Id. at 50-51.
221. Id. at 51.
222. Id. at 50-51. Professor Zimmer’s purpose in showing the similarities between the
determinative influence standard and the motivating factor standard is ultimately to argue for the abandonment of McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 51. As shown below, McDonnell
Douglas should, as Professor Zimmer argues, be discarded. See discussion infra Part V.
223. Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CAL. L. REV. 983,
1008 (1999).
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regardless of plaintiff’s proof.224 Professor Green concludes that the
McDonnell Douglas format, including the prima facie case, should
apply in all cases, and that, at stepthree, plaintiffs should be given
the flexibility to present any evidence, either to prove pretext, or
more generally, to meet the motivating factor test.225
Although Professor Green’s view integrates McDonnell Douglas
and Price Waterhouse into a unitary framework, by advocating the
unconditional use of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, she
would perpetuate a confusing regime that unnecessarily complicates
individual disparate treatment law and guarantees cumbersome jury
instructions. Furthermore, the prima facie case focuses on issues that
may have only peripheral relevance in many discrimination cases. 226
Applying the multi-element McDonnell Douglas prima facie case may
distract the factfinder from the contested issues or may even result in
questionable dismissals. Perhaps even more important, the prima facie case of McDonnell Douglas conflicts with the Price Waterhouse
framework. A plaintiff rejected for a job must prove, as an element of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, that he was qualified for the
job. If a plaintiff fails to meet this burden, he loses the case. For example, in Thomas v. Chrysler Financial, LLC, Thomas alleged that
Chrysler Financial violated Title VII by refusing to promote her.227
The district court granted Chrysler Financial summary judgment because Thomas could not prove an element of the prima facie case—
that her education, experience, and job-performance were similar to
one of the two individuals who received the promotion she had
sought.228

224. Id. at 1000.
225. Id. at 1011.
226. See Smith, supra note 95, at 377-78. He states:
The prima facie case elements most often are only marginally related to the focus of the case. Many of the elements are typically stipulated . . . or else subject
to very little dispute. . . . Litigants rarely spend much trial time or energy on
such matters, because the ultimate question of discriminatory intent hinges on
controverted factual circumstances and credibility questions.
....
Ultimately, the prima facie case does very little to advance a Title VII plaintiff’s quest for a final adjudication of discrimination.
Id.
227. 278 F. Supp. 2d 922, 923 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
228. Id. at 927 (citing Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir.
2002) (affirming summary judgment for Avery Dennison because Patterson did not create
a triable issue of fact that Avery Dennison treated her less favorably than similarly situated male employees)); see also, e.g., Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315-17
(4th Cir. 1993) (holding that an element of a prima facie reduction-in-force case is that the
retained group contained some worker not in the protected class performing at a lower
level than the plaintiff and upholding the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Data General because Mitchell could not meet this element), modified by Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2000).
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A plaintiff has no such burden of proof under Price Waterhouse.
As the Eleventh Circuit observed in Wright v. Southland Corp., an
employer can illegally discriminate against a worker who is unqualified.229 The court explained that employers often hire unqualified
workers, hoping that the workers will gain expertise over time.230 An
unqualified plaintiff can win under Price Waterhouse but not under
McDonnell Douglas. Under Price Waterhouse, the defendant gets the
opportunity to limit the remedy by proving the same-decision partial
defense. It can establish this defense by showing that the plaintiff
was unqualified just as it could establish the defense by showing incompetence, insubordination, or any other nondiscriminatory reason.
The same reasoning applies regarding the fourth element of a refusal-to-hire case: that the employer continued to seek applicants.
Even if the employer canceled the job opening, it might nevertheless
have discriminated against an applicant in a protected group. If the
applicant meets the motivating factor test, he wins, and the employer
can then attempt to establish a partial defense by showing that it
canceled the job for a business reason.
D. The Ninth Circuit’s Solution
The Ninth Circuit, in Costa, made a commendable effort at harmonizing existing disparate treatment law, although the court faltered by misunderstanding the role the Supreme Court established
for McDonnell Douglas. Like Professor Green,231 the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that McDonnell Douglas expressly permits the use of “direct proof” of discrimination, even if the evidence is irrelevant to the
issue of pretext. The Ninth Circuit therefore asserted that McDonnell
Douglas is not limited to single-motive cases, but applies even when
mixed motives are at issue.232 To free jurors from daunting McDonnell Douglas instructions, the court interpreted McDonnell Douglas

229. 187 F.3d 1287, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 1999). In Wright, the Eleventh Circuit observed:
[D]iscrimination is possible despite the fact that the person is not qualified for
the relevant position. Numerous people in America hold positions for which
they are not qualified; this happens because, for instance, the employer may
not be aware that the employee is unqualified, the employer may have hired
the employee as a means of returning a favor to someone (despite the fact that
the employee was unqualified for the position), or the employer may hope that
the employee will in due time acquire the necessary qualifications. Therefore, it
is possible for an employer to discriminate on the basis of a protected personal
characteristic in a manner that does not allow the victim of the discrimination
to establish the McDonnell Douglas presumption.
Id. (footnote omitted).
230. Id. at 1300.
231. See Green, supra note 223, at 1008.
232. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct.
2148 (2003).
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to apply to summary judgment motions rather than to trials.233 Thus,
according to the Ninth Circuit, a McDonnell Douglas jury charge is
generally inappropriate.234 Rather, the proper jury instructions depend on whether a jury might reasonably find that only one cause or
more than one cause motivated the employer’s adverse employment
action.235 If the court determines that the only reasonable view of the
evidence is that illegal discrimination was either the sole cause of the
adverse employment action or that it played no role in the employment action, the jury should be instructed that it must determine
whether the employment action was taken “because of” illegal discrimination.236 If, on the other hand, the evidence reasonably supports the conclusion that discrimination was one of two or more
causes for the adverse employment action, the jury must be instructed to decide if discrimination was a “motivating factor” for the
employment action.237 If the jury finds that the evidence meets the
motivating factor test, the jury must then consider the same-decision
partial defense prescribed in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.238 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that a plaintiff may support any case for
discrimination by disproving the employer’s alleged justification for
the adverse employment action.239
Although intriguing, the Ninth Circuit’s explanation is flawed.
First, it is clear that the Supreme Court intended the McDonnell
Douglas framework to apply not only at the summary judgment stage
but also at trial. McDonnell Douglas went to the Supreme Court after
trial, and the High Court remanded the case to afford the plaintiffrespondent “a fair opportunity to show that petitioner’s stated reason
for respondent’s rejection was in fact pretext.”240 The Supreme Court
heard Burdine after a bench trial and explicitly linked the three-step,
burden-shifting approach to the “trier of fact.”241 One might argue
that both these cases preceded the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
provided Title VII plaintiffs with the right to a jury trial, and that
the Supreme Court never intended for jurors, untutored in legalisms,
to grapple with complex McDonnell Douglas instructions. However,
years after adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Reeves Court
applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to a jury trial.242 Second,
McDonnell Douglas applies only to single-motive cases. The plain233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 857.
Id.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000).
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tiff’s step-three burden is to disprove the defendant’s step-two reason,
which permits the factfinder to infer discriminatory intent. Price
Waterhouse vitiated the McDonnell Douglas Court’s reference to “direct” proof as an alternative method of establishing the plaintiff’s
case. As the Price Waterhouse plurality explained, “the premise of
Burdine is that either a legitimate or an illegitimate set of considerations led to the challenged decision.”243 Third, it is often unpredictable whether the trier of fact will reasonably credit both the discriminatory reason and the defendant’s justification. For example, a
plaintiff may offer evidence which, if believed, would meet the motivating factor test, but the defendant may credibly contest that evidence. No sensible method segregates single-motive cases from
mixed-motives cases. Thus, despite the laudable intentions of the
Ninth Circuit, a court will frequently have to provide the jury with
alternative instructions. Finally, vaguely instructing the jury that it
must determine if the employer’s adverse action was “because of”
race or sex fails to clarify the relevant causation standard. One of the
purposes of Price Waterhouse and § 2000e-2(m) was to explain what
“because of” means.244
The Ninth Circuit is correct, however, when it asserts that proof
of pretext is merely one form of proof of discrimination. Proving pretext supports an inference that discriminatory intent motivated the
defendant’s adverse employment decision. Juries can draw such an
inference when given Price Waterhouse instructions without resort to
McDonnell Douglas. Except in rare cases where McDonnell Douglas
forces otherwise reluctant plaintiffs to articulate justifications for
contested decisions, McDonnell Douglas does not advance the quest
of proving discrimination. Even in such circumstances, the law
should permit a defendant to use whatever litigation strategy it

243. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1988), superseded by statute as
stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). The Court stated:
Where a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
motives, however, it simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was “the ‘true reason’” for the decision—which is the question asked by
Burdine. Oblivious to this last point, the dissent would insist that Burdine’s
framework perform work that it was never intended to perform. It would require a plaintiff who challenges an adverse employment decision in which both
legitimate and illegitimate considerations played a part to pretend that the decision, in fact, stemmed from a single source—for the premise of Burdine is that
either a legitimate or an illegitimate set of considerations led to the challenged
decision. To say that Burdine’s evidentiary scheme will not help us decide a
case admittedly involving both kinds of considerations is not to cast aspersions
on the utility of that scheme in the circumstances for which it was designed.
Id. (citations omitted). It is critical to recognize, however, that neither Burdine nor
McDonnell Douglas require the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the “true reason.” Rather, these cases allow the factfinder to draw an inference of discrimination if the
plaintiff proves a prima facie case and disproves the employer’s articulated reason.
244. Id. at 240.
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deems appropriate. Since both McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse use the motivating factor test, no sound reason counsels to
perpetuate the convoluted three-step, burden-shifting framework.
Price Waterhouse, as amended by § 2000e-(2)(m) and explained by
Costa, is all discrimination law needs. The law should recognize this
approach as the universal standard.
V. CONCLUSION
Though squarely contradicted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse caused so
much confusion among the circuits that the Supreme Court had to
decide Costa to clarify the law. The unanimous Costa Court was correct in holding that a plaintiff can earn a Price Waterhouse jury instruction based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Neither the
statute nor its legislative history contains any ambiguities on that
score. Furthermore, the statute took the right approach. Separating
individual disparate treatment cases into direct versus circumstantial cases injected a senseless distinction into the law. Any evidence,
circumstantial or direct, may meet the motivating factor test.
The Costa decision, however, raised a broader issue. Since being
decided in 1973, McDonnell Douglas, once a powerful force for allowing the factfinder to infer discrimination, has been hobbled. Reeves
and Hicks have drained McDonnell Douglas of all vitality, and Costa
renders McDonnell Douglas superfluous. The Court seems unwilling
to acknowledge that the McDonnell Douglas regime confounds the
law with complexities that serve no useful purpose. Two factors
probably explain the Court’s inaction: fidelity to stare decisis and a
conservative Supreme Court’s fear that, by overruling a venerable
line of civil rights cases, it will inflame the ire of its liberal critics.
Fixated on an ill-chosen phrase in Hazen Paper, many judges and
scholars believe that McDonnell Douglas, as redefined by Hicks, requires a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the but-for cause
of the adverse employment action, whereas Price Waterhouse, as
modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, follows the motivating factor
test. This view misconceives McDonnell Douglas. The motivating factor test is the only causation standard for individual disparate
treatment cases. The McDonnell Douglas framework permits the
factfinder to infer that the defendant was motivated by discriminatory intent when the plaintiff disproves the defendant’s articulated
justification for its decision. McDonnell Douglas is therefore compatible with § 2000e-2(m).
Given the Court’s reticence to clarify the law, Congress must
seize the initiative by amending Title VII. Because McDonnell Douglas, after Hicks, Reeves, and Costa, confuses the law, McDonnell
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Douglas-type cases should settle into their proper place under the
motivating factor test of § 2000e-2(m).245 The abandonment of
McDonnell Douglas would require some minor refinements of Title
VII. Section 2000e-2(m) should be amended to make explicit that a
defendant is not required to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment decision. The section should also state that
if the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff
is not obligated to disprove it. Furthermore, the section should provide that if the plaintiff disproves the defendant’s nondiscriminatory
explanation, the jury may accord such disproof whatever weight it
deems appropriate. Such evidentiary rules are not ordinarily included in substantive statutes, but a congressional repudiation of
McDonnell Douglas requires explicit legislation. A tortuous history of
misconstrued statutes and garbled Supreme Court decisions counsels
for precision. 246
These modifications will rid the law of unnecessary complexities
and evidentiary distortions. Jurors will not have to learn the tricky
three-step, burden-shifting approach or grapple with alternative instructions. A defendant will not have to articulate a justification for
its actions, if it prefers, for tactical reasons, not to do so. The jury,
however, will be free to draw a negative inference from the defendant’s silence. A single standard, the motivating factor test, will apply to all cases. This approach, with the necessary modifications, will

245. See Davis, supra note 175:
There is some solace in the hope (perhaps the inevitability) that nonplussed
jurors, regardless of McDonnell Douglas, will revert to their common sense and
decide cases based on whether they think the employer discriminated. But the
evidentiary distortions of the McDonnell Douglas scheme will hinder their deliberations. In rejecting the pretext-only rule, Hicks has eliminated any slender
justification for retaining the McDonnell Douglas scheme.
Id. at 761.
246. The new law would lead to simplified jury instructions, which would be more understandable and more sensible than the present regime. Based on the premise that §
2000e-2(m) applies to all disparate treatment cases, Benjamin Mizer has proposed jury instructions that focus entirely on the motivating factor test. See Mizer, supra note 189, at
263. Mizer’s proposed instructions provide:
In light of all of the evidence that has been presented, was the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic] a motivating factor in the defendant’s [adverse employment] decision?
If the defendant was motivated by the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic],
would the defendant have made the same decision even if it had not considered
the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic]?
If you find that the defendant would have made the same decision if it had not
considered the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic], I will decide what kind of
relief is equitable to correct the violation of the law. If you find, however, that
the defendant would not have made the same decision, you must also determine [the amount of damages to award].
Id. (alterations in original).
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preserve the inference that a factfinder might draw from proof of pretext.
Hicks and Reeves have staggered McDonnell Douglas. Price
Waterhouse has the muscle to replace it. Like a prizefighter who has
lost his punch, McDonnell Douglas should retire and make a graceful
retreat into history.

